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Whither the Neutral Agency? Rethinking Bias in
Regulatory Administration
DANIEL B. RODRIGUEZ†
I.

INTRODUCTION

A sacrosanct principle of administrative justice is that
agency officials, especially in administrative adjudication,
should be entirely neutral and objective.1 This is an
† Harold Washington Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School
of Law. I am grateful for feedback on earlier drafts of this article from workshop
participants at Harvard Law School and University of Pennsylvania Law School
and members of the administrative law colloquium at University of Lyon, France.
1. Combating bias in regulatory administration comes into relief principally
in the context of agency adjudication. This is an understandable outgrowth of the
classic distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in two early 20th century cases,
Londoner v Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908), and Bi-Metallic v. State Board of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). In those classic cases, the Court distinguished
between the circumstance in which the agency decision targeted a discrete group
of individuals, and hence resembled the traditional model of adjudication, and
where the agency decision was more akin to general policymaking. Due process,
said the Court in these two cases, is applicable to the former, but not the latter.
See generally CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 39–42 (1990); Roger C. Cramton, A Comment on TrialType Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REV. 585, 587–91 (1972).
While the APA effaces in one fundamental respect the Londoner/Bi-Metallic
dichotomy, in that it imposes the same procedural obligations on an agency in a
formal, on-the-record rulemaking as it does in a formal adjudication, the
distinction consists to persist in the constitutional due process realm. Still, there
have been some notable applications of bias in the context of rulemaking. For
example, the bias prohibitions in section 556(b) of the APA apply to formal
rulemaking, which aspires to be both deliberative and transparent, and is not the
result of external influence. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b).
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application in the administrative agency context of the
ancient maxim “aliquis non debet esse Judex in propria
causa.”2 Yet the law is very confused about what that means,
at both a conceptual and a practical level. Agencies should be
impartial, except where impartiality is impractical or
unwarranted. Bias is bad, except when it is not. This
confusion raises important questions for modern
administrative law. In this Article, I interrogate these
confusions and unpack the conceptual underpinnings of
agency neutrality. And I suggest that there are better ways
to think about impartiality and bias. We should embrace
optimal bias, and organize the messy doctrines that deal
with different circumstances of agency impartiality in
schemes that are more suited to the aims of regulatory
administration.
Let us begin with the conundrum that lies at the heart
of the administrative state. Our theory of the administrative
state is undergirded by our faith in the ability of regulatory
agencies and their officials to govern in the public interest
and consistent with the rule of law.3 And yet the rules that
make up modern administrative law, supplemented by the
procedural due process requirements under the U.S.
Constitution, are built on the idea that agencies are

2. See Dr. Bonham’s Case, 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (C.P.
1610); see also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 102 (Michael Oakeshott ed. 1964)
(1651) (“no man is a fit Arbitrator in his own cause . . . . For the same reason no
man in any Cause ought to be received for Arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or
honour, or pleasure apparently ariseth out of the victory of one party . . . .”). See
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1914–23 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(discussing of the origins of the nemo iudex principle). On the origins of the
principle, see Adrian Vermeule, Contra “Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa”: The Limits
of Impartiality, 122 YALE L.J. 384, 386–87 (2012) [hereinafter Vermeule, The
Limits of Impartiality].
3. The locus classicus of this view remains JAMES LANDIS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) [hereinafter LANDIS, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS].
See also ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016) [hereinafter VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION];
DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1940, at 51–77 (2014).
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frequently unworthy of our trust,4 and that “experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”5
This trust/mistrust puzzle is at the core of administrative
law;6 and, as well, at our concept of the separation of powers
and its role in structuring regulatory administration in
modern America.7 In the big picture, the story of regulatory
administration and legal rules in the United States is largely
a story of how we work diligently8 and strategically9 to set
the conditions for trust at the right level.10

4. See generally Edward H. Stiglitz, Delegation for Trust, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
633, 653 (2018); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative State, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975). I use “we” and “our” here to
refer to the American system and, even more specifically, to the contours of the
administrative state at the federal level principally. However, the dilemma of
trust and the development of administrative law as an effort at solution is at
issue in other systems as well. See, e.g., SOREN SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2000).
5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
6. And it is ever evolving. See, e.g., JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP:
PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2017); Gillian E. Metzger,
The Supreme Court 2016 Term, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State
Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (2017) (describing the anti-administrative
attacks of the last few years); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian
Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393 (2015) [hereinafter Sunstein &
Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law] (describing these developments in
the pre-Donald Trump era); Roscoe Pound, The Recrudescence of Absolutism, 47
SEWANEE REV. 18, 27 (1939) (expressing concerns soon after the New Deal).
O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1978); Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987).
7. See,

e.g.,

JAMES

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND

8. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003)
[hereinafter Bressman, Beyond Accountability].
9. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008); Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative
Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between
Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (2006). See generally Daniel B.
Rodriguez, Administrative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS
340, 350–55 (Keith E. Whittington ed. 2008) (describing strategic models of
administrative law and agency oversight).
10. In this narrative, the New Deal gets most of the limelight. See G. Edward
White, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 13–32 (2000); MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870-1960, at 213–46; Mark Tushnet,
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Many of our concerns with the actions of administrators
emerge from a persistent worry that agency officials will
approach their tasks with an agenda in mind, an agenda that
is inconsistent with the agency’s delegated power and with
the public interest.11 We want to take steps to make sure that
our fundamental faith in regulatory governance is
warranted.12
The worry underlying the law of bias in regulatory
administration is that agency officials will make decisions
that reflect their bias, including their self-interest, their
ambient and specific prejudices, and the influence of outside
stakeholders, especially political officials. This situation is at
odds with the commitment to a process that is objective,
transparent, and open to evidence and persuasive legal
Administrative Law in the 1930s: The Supreme Court’s Accommodation of
Progressive Legal Theory, 60 DUKE L.J. 1655 (2011); Reuel E. Schiller, The End
of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal
Constitutionalism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399 (2007). But Jerry Mashaw reminds us
that these issues go back to the founding era. See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(2012) [hereinafter
MASHAW, CREATING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION].
11. The problem of the willful agency is well known, in both the legal
literature and in political science. See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARON
O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS (1999); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of
Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? (John E. Chubb &
Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989); David B. Spence, Managing Delegation ex ante:
Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEG. STUD. 413 (1999);
Kathleen Bawn, Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about
Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62 (1995); Peter H. Aranson,
Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 2 (1982).
12. As conventionally organized in the treatises and other doctrinal surveys
on administrative law, bias law is focused specifically on situations in which
administrators have biases about particular facts in dispute. This is a somewhat
arbitrary way to draw the line, however. Where administrators are biased as to
legal questions or the application of law to facts, this can raise an issue of bias as
well. Insofar as bias arises in a myriad of circumstances, involving different
elements of the proceeding (including both adjudicative and legislative facts, and
also legal interpretation), we can and will discuss all of this as part of bias law.
On the adjudicative and legislative facts distinction more generally, see Kenneth
Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942).
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argument. In a broad sense, the predicament of biased
administrative decisionmaking is just a variation on the
theme of our mistrust of agencies more generally. How do we
curtail bad official behavior? And how do we incentivize good
behavior?13 Administrative law has traditionally handled the
risks of bias in two ways: first, through the review of
administrative agency decisions to ensure that they are
supported by adequate reasons and are rational, in the sense
defined by statute and by administrative common law;14 and,
second through various doctrinal tests, emerging from both
constitutional due process and statute (including, but not
limited to, the Administrative Procedure Act.15 The main
objective of these anti-bias doctrines to set out the
parameters of what it means to have an agency
decisionmaker who has an open mind and, further, why such
a requirement is essential.16
When viewed as a whole, however, the courts’ bias
doctrines are incorrigible and puzzling.17 The doctrines are
13. But not always. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The
Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2014); Rachel E. Barkow,
Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative
Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009).
14. On administrative common law, see, for example, Gillian Metzger,
Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293 (2012).
15. See 5 U.S.C.§ 556(b). See generally KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.7, at 867 (6th ed. 2018) (“The
statutory criteria often are stated in broad terms that mirror the language courts
use when they apply the due process requirement of a neutral decisionmaker.”).
16. Although, as we will explore in more detail below, the way that this
requirement is framed at the level of the rationale for the principle differs. See,
e.g., Kevin M. Stack, An Administrative Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law in the
Administrative State, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1985, 2015 (2015) (describing neutral
decisionmaker as sourced in the rule of law); Peter L. Strauss, Disqualifications
of Decisional Officials in Rulemaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (1980) [hereinafter
Strauss, Disqualifications] (describing anti-bias law in “conflict of interest”
terms); Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975)
[hereinafter Friendly, Hearing] (describing this as a requisite of an adjudicatory
process that aspires to be fundamentally fair).
17. To be sure, not everyone sees it this way. Authors of a leading treatise
attempt heroically to synthesize the doctrine around five meanings of bias,
concluding that “[t]he heart of each of the five propositions is supported by clear

380

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

both under inclusive and over inclusive. They are under
inclusive in that they can barely scratch the surface of the
true threats to fairness and rationality and other key goals
of regulatory administration.18 And they are also
overinclusive in that they constrain administrators in often
counterproductive ways, substituting ill-formed judgments
about which decisions and decisionmakers are bad or good
for more nuanced decisionmaking strategies, employed by
agencies to solve “polycentric” problems19 and to implement
the will of the elected branches under whose charge they
operate.
In this Article, I explore bias law’s logic and its limits.
What do we mean when we talk about bias in regulatory
administration? What exactly are the cognizable threats to
“good” regulatory decisionmaking that bias doctrine helps
redress? And what does a more wide-angled look at the
connection between anti-bias law and the performance of
agencies in a scheme of “separated institutions sharing
powers.”20
I argue that in order to shape legal prohibitions on bias
in agency decisionmaking, whether by judicial rules and
standards, legislatively mandated procedures, and
institutional design, we need a better way of understanding
the reasons for particular prohibitions, that is, why bias
matters to regulatory decisionmaking. And, as well, we need
to be considerably clearer about what particular threats to a
fair and rational administrative process are most serious
and, likewise, how to become confident that the cure is not

and noncontroversial law and by prevailing opinion . . . .” However, they finish
this sentence thusly: “except that the first two propositions are commonly
misunderstood, especially the effect of a closed mind on . . . issues of legislative
fact.” HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 15, § 7.7, at 868.
18. See text accompanying notes infra Part III.
19. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353 (1972); see infra text accompanying notes 229–38 (discussing Fuller).
20. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP
FROM FDR TO CARTER 26 (1980).
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worse than the disease being treated.
Ultimately, the role of the courts in disqualification-forbias inquiries should narrow. Judges’ principal role should
be to ensure that agencies are operating within the structure
of statutory guidelines and rationality (read: not arbitrary),
requirements in administrative and constitutional law.
When we see more clearly the nexus between the
administrative process and the goals to which agencies
aspire under statutory objectives and the wider goals of
sensible regulatory administration, we can see how the
matter of what is or is not improper bias should be
recalibrated to pursue the goal of optimal bias rather than
the goal of its elimination.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Part II, I describe the
basic contours of bias law, focusing on the variegated
problems
that
bias
doctrine
in
administrative
decisionmaking aims to resolve. Part III explores the
rationales for bias doctrines, saying more than was sketched
briefly in this introduction about fairness, rationality, and
checks and balances under our principles of the separation of
powers. From this, in Part IV, I offer some ideas for
improving bias law. Part V concludes.
II. WHAT IS IT ALL ABOUT? DECOMPOSING ADMINISTRATOR
BIAS AND ITS ELEMENTS
The law on bias in regulatory administration starts with
the core principle that a fair, rational procedure requires
agency officials who approach their tasks with an openmind.21 Administrative decisions should be scrupulously fair,
meaning at least that it should not be infected with improper

21. In the administrative adjudication context, this is derivative to the
general principle applied to all judges. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S.
238, 242 (1980) (Due process entitles defendant to “a proceeding in which he may
present his case with assurance” that no member of the court is “predisposed to
find against him.”); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (Due process
guarantees “an absence of actual bias” on the part of the judge).
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considerations.22 Of course, we will seldom know for sure
why an agency decided this way or that. Even a scrupulous
requirement of reason-giving and a record to review will not
betray what is locked tightly in the decisionmaker’s head.
But insofar as we worry nonetheless about the temptation to
misbehave, and also about the appearance of impropriety,
judicially crafted bias rules help to assuage these worries.
From this principle, we move into a forest of variegated
doctrines, each establishing a standard at a reasonably high
level of generality and instructing courts to look at key facts
to determine whether an agency official has, or will be
perceived as having been, compromised.23 But what are the
exact contents and limits of this principle of unbiased
administrative decisionmaking? How do we define and
measure bias?24 And when does this neutrality yield to other
principles, or to the exigencies of the administrative process?
Bias stands in for a confluence of circumstances,
basically instances in which an administrator departs from
22. See MICHAEL ASIMOW, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., ADJUDICATION OUTSIDE
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 18 (Draft.
Report, 2016),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/adjudication-outside-theadministrative-procedure-act-draft-report.pdf [hereinafter ACUS REPORT] (“A[n]
[agency] decisionmaking (either the [administrative judge] or the reconsidering
authority) should not be biased for or against any party. An impartial
decisionmaker is an essential element of an evidentiary hearing and is required
both by Due Process and by the APA.”).
23. Although I am not aware of a specific discussion in the literature on this
subject that goes down this road, we might see bias as one species of a general
concern with public corruption (perhaps defined as “the abuse of public power for
private gain”). For an illuminating discussion of the definitional and
measurement aspects of corruption which might bear on this question, see
Matthew Stephenson, On the Political Subtext of Definition Debates, Part 2:
Measurement or Moralism, THE GLOB. CORRUPTION BLOG (MAY 8, 2018),
https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2018/05/08/on-the-political-subtext-ofcorruption-definition-debates-part-2-measurement-or-moralism/.
24. Certainly, one of the more unhelpful statements of the right measure for
unlawful bias in the judicial context comes from the Supreme Court as recently
as 2016: “[The] precedents set forth an objective standard that requires recusal
when the likelihood of bias on the part of the judge ‘is too high to be
constitutionally tolerable.’” Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1903
(2016) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
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baseline of neutrality and thereby disrupts the process in
ways we believe improper. Viewed broadly, we can separate
these disruptions into three categories: interest, prejudice,
and influence.25
A. Interest
It is from Lord Coke in Dr. Bonham’s Case that we get
the ancient maxim “aliquis non debet esse Judex in propria
causa,”26 a judge shall not be a judge in his own case.27 Acting
on the basis of self-interest is the model case of improper
decisionmaking. It collides with natural justice, under
ancient principles in the English common law;28 it is
inconsistent with our commitments to procedural due
process; and it is at odds with our maintenance in our
administrative process of a regime of regulatory fairness and
administrative rationality.
The foundational cases on bias/prejudice concern
allegations of self-interest by judges in ordinary
adjudication. In Tumey v. Ohio,29 the Court considered the
scheme by which state district judges resolved misconduct
claims under relevant prohibition statutes and received pay
based upon the revenue received from fines imposed for
25. Scholars do divide up these aspects of bias in different ways. See, e.g.,
HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 15, § 7.7, at 867 (describing the five meanings of
bias); Robert R. Kuehn, Bias in Environmental Agency Decision Making, 45 ENV’T
L. 957, 971 (laying out a taxonomy of agency bias which consists of six categories);
Judith K. Meierhenry, The Due Process Right to an Unbiased Adjudicator in
Administrative Proceedings, 36 S.D. L. REV. 551, 555 (1991) (dividing bias into
four categories).
26. See Dr. Bonham’s Case, 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (C.P.
1610).
27. See HOBBES, supra note 2; Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1915–23 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the origins of the nemo iudex principle).
28. See David Phillip Jones & Anne S. de Villars, PRINCIPLES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 208–223 (5th ed. 2009). For an early application of this
natural justice principle to the American legal context, see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
386, 388 (1798). See generally Vermeule, The Limits of Impartiality, supra note
2.
29. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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violations. “[I]t certainly violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of
due process of law,” declared the Court, “to subject [a
defendant’s] liberty or property to the judgment of a court the
judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary
interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.”30
Tumey’s logic was most compelling in instances of financial
self-interest.31 In Ward v. Village of Monroeville,32 for
example, the Court compelled the disqualification of a mayor
who supervised village affairs while much of the village
income came from fines and fees imposed by him in the socalled mayor’s court. The test, said the Court here “is
whether the mayor’s situation is one ‘which would offer a
possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget
the burden of proof required to convict the defendant . . . .’”33
The plaintiff challenging the actions of the official had no
obligation to prove that the profit motive actually influenced
the outcome of the case—a daunting task in the absence of a
smoking gun.34 It was enough to rest this doctrine on the
30. Id. at 523. The controlling principle, as the Court summarized it, is this:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear
and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due
process of law.
Id. at 532; see also HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 15.
31. And, indeed, this tracks the typical criminal statutes which, as in the case
of 18 U.S.C. § 208, prohibit government officials (in this statute, executive branch
officials) form participating in a case in which she has a financial interest. See
also Exec. Order No. 11,222 § 203, 30 Fed. Reg. 6469 (1965) (“Employees may not
. . . have direct or indirect financial interests that conflict substantially . . . with
their responsibilities and duties as Federal employees.”); Williams, 136 S. Ct. at
1909 (due process “demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial
disqualifications” (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828
(1986))).
32. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
33. Id. at 60.
34. Cf. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (noting that court should
not “probe the mental processes” of administrative officials in reviewing agency
decisions). In light of the bias cases in administrative adjudication, this
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compelling idea that such decisionmaking raises the
appearance of impropriety.35
Pecuniary self-dealing by a judge was the subject of
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.36 In Caperton, a captain of
industry had donated a total of $3 million to the reelection
campaign of a state supreme court justice who subsequently
heard his case.37 The central question before the Supreme
Court was whether this evinces the appearance of
impropriety warranting mandatory disqualification from the
case. Yes, insisted the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Kennedy. Says Kennedy:
[T]here is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and
reasonable perceptions—when a person with a personal stake in a
particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in
placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the
judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or
imminent.38

This case illustrates the kind of “extreme facts”—pecuniary
self-interest—which the Court has held to violate the
blackletter statement is somewhat peculiar. In the typical bias case, the courts
do in fact examine the circumstances under which the decision was made in order
to reveal, if there is evidence pertinent to this point, whether or not the
administrator was prejudiced one way or the other. It is hard to do this without,
at some level, probing the mental processes of the official.
35. One challenge faced by courts in applying Tumey was how to deal with
situations in which the financial interest was rather indirect. In Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979), for example, the challenge was to a board tasked with
licensing optometrists, with the claim being that the requirement that board
members “be members of a specified organization of optometrists.” HICKMAN &
PIERCE, supra note 15, § 7.7, at 877. As Hickman and Pierce note, this case
illustrates the difficulty of applying the principle from Tumey, as “[m]any
members of agency boards and commissions have some degree of economic
interest in the subject they regulate.” Id.
36. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
37. To put this amount in some context, “Blankenship’s $3 million in
contributions were more than the total amount spent by all other Benjamin
supporters and three times the amount spent by Benjamin’s own committee. Id.,
at 288a. Caperton contends that Blankenship spent $1 million more than the
total amount spent by the campaign committees of both candidates combined.”
Id. at 873.
38. Id. at 884.
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Constitution.39
Lower courts applied Tumey and its progeny in a series
of cases over the years.40 In 1973, at long last, the Supreme
Court weighed in, holding in Gibson v. Berryhill41 that
pecuniary self-interest is improper under the due process
clause to administrative agency proceedings. The Supreme
Court upheld the judgment of the district court that a
licensing process for optometrists in which members of the
three-person board were made up of optometrists (read:
competitors) within the state of Alabama violated the due
process clause.42 “It is sufficiently clear from our cases,” said
the Court, “that those with substantial pecuniary interest in
legal proceedings should not adjudicate these disputes.”43
Ordinarily, pecuniary self-interest is seen as
undermining the administrative process by compromising—
or being seen as compromising—the objectivity of the
administrator. On occasion, however, the concern with self-

39. See id. at 887.
40. See, e.g., Ward v. Vill. Of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); FTC v. Cement
Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Alpha Epsilon Phi Tau Chapter Hous. Ass’n v. City of
Berkeley, 114 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1997); Air Line Pilots Ass’n. Intern. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Transp., 899 F.2d 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776
F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1985); Morris v. City of Danville, 744 F.2d 1041 (4th Cir. 1984);
Skelly Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 375 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. granted,
398 U.S. 817 (1967), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 390 U.S. 747 (1968); Pangburn
v. Civ. Aeronautics Bd., 311 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC,
267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
41. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
42. One of the interesting features of Gibson, notwithstanding its status as a
seminal administrative bias case, is that the Court noted that the district court’s
rationale for disqualifying the board members rested not only on the matter of
pecuniary self-interest, but also on the grounds that there was an unacceptable
co-mingling of functions, as the board members acted as “both prosecutor and
judge in delicensing proceedings” and, further, that board members might have
“‘preconceived opinions’” with regard to pending cases before them.” Id. at 570.
The Court in Gibson thus collapsed a number of the considerations that go into
bias evaluations, although in the end it declared, plausibly, that this was a case
in which the district court’s evaluation, as the court closest to the scene, was
entitled to deference.
43. Id. at 579.
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dealing is raised at the level of the agency itself. The D.C.
Circuit considered the matter of agency self-interest in Ass’n
of American Railroads v. Department of Transportation,44 a
2016 decision involving Amtrak.45 The question before the
court in this case was, as Judge Brown put it, “whether it
violates due process for Congress to give a self-interested
entity rulemaking authority over its competitors.”46 The selfinterest here was Amtrak’s potential economic advantage
over competitor freight operators given one regulatory choice
over another. The court drew from the fact that Amtrak
might benefit from particular impositions on competitors
that agency may well be biased in their promulgation of
rules.47 Curiously, neither Gibson nor Caperton nor any
other case involving bias based on pecuniary self-interest
was cited in the court’s decision. Rather, it based its
reasoning on a chestnut delegation case from the 1930s,
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.48 The D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in
Ass’n of American Railroads is both inscrutable and
inexplicable. Carter was decided under the commerce clause,
not the due process clause.49 Moreover, it was part of the
trilogy of cases involving the National Industrial Recovery
Act and the Court’s fabled skepticism about the scope and
contours of legislative delegation.50 Having been rebuked by
the Supreme Court just one year before in its holding that
this statute was an unconstitutional delegation of regulatory

44. 821 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
45. This was just one part of the Amtrak litigation saga. The D.C. Circuit had
previously struck down the organic statute, the Passenger Rail Investment and
Improvement Act of 2008, as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
The Supreme Court reversed this holding in Department of Transportation v.
Ass’n of American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015).
46. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 821 F.3d at 27.
47. Id. at 34.
48. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
49. Id. at 247.
50. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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power,51 the choice to rest its decision on Carter Coal is a
curious one, to put it mildly.52
The takeaway from this discussion is that pecuniary selfinterest lies at the core of due process concern. And, where
the positive law comes from another source, pecuniary such
self-interest is likewise problematic.53 While the principle is
more difficult to apply than it might appear as first glance,
as we will discuss in Part IV later, the embrace of the
principle in both judicial and administrative proceedings
could not be clearer.
B. Prejudice
Courts have held that decisionmaking is legally
impermissible where the administrator comes to her decision
with a closed mind and where it appears likely that she based
her decision on improper criteria.54 The idea here trades on
51. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015).
52. There seems little to be learned from Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., other than the
ire so close to the surface of Judge Brown’s opinion about Congress’s decision to
turn to give wide regulatory authority to Amtrak. For another critical view of
Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., see Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Morality of
Administrative Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1964–65 (2018) [hereinafter
Sunstein & Vermeule, Morality of Administrative Law] (describing the court’s
reasoning as “ultimately conclusory”). Ultimately, however, Sunstein &
Vermeule are more generous to Judge Brown’s opinion than I would be. They
write: “The best defense of the decision, if there is one, invokes the internal
institutional morality of administrative decisionmaking . . . .” Id. at 1965; see also
Sunstein & Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, supra note 6, at 421–23.
53. The Supreme Court recently considered a question of agency self-interest
under the Sherman Antitrust Act. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC,
135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). Using a rationale similar, if not identical, to the Tumey
and Caperton analysis of financial self-interest, the Court struck down the
actions of a state agency controlled by dentists prohibiting non-dentists from
providing teeth whitening services. Id. The risk, according to the Court, was that
these market participants would engage in “private self-dealing” rather than the
public interest. See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 15, § 7.7, at 878.
54. See CHARLES H. KOCH & RICHARD MURPHY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 6.10 (3d ed. 2011) (in section entitled “basic right to impartiality,”
noting that “proof of bias or prejudgment without more may invalidate a decision
or disqualify a decisionmaker”); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND PROCESS 455 (3rd ed. 1999) [hereinafter PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
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the basic idea underlying the “nemo indux” principle and
that is that we want our administrators to come to the matter
before them without having made up their mind already.55
Pecuniary self-interest illustrates this predicament; indeed,
it reflects perhaps the most serious threat to the integrity of
an administrative process, whether in adjudication or in
rulemaking. Nonetheless, courts have found against
administrative decisionmakers where the closed mind
emerges for other, non-financially-self-interested, reasons.56
1. The Requirement of an Open-Minded Decisionmaker
We expect, in administrative adjudication that the
decisionmaker is neutral and impartial,57 and that the
process is an objective one, that is, a process wherein the
decision will be reached on the basis of proof and argument
and the best assessment of the law.58 Therefore, disputants
can be confident that the decision will be based upon proper

AND PROCESS] (describing this issue as growing out of the requirement of “decider
neutrality”).
55. See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 15, § 7.7 at 882–85.
56. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (requiring the
opportunity to rebut facts before neutral decisionmaker); Gutierrez de Martinez
v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (holding that a U.S. attorney, on the facts of this
case, had an “institutional bias”); NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 656
(1949) (finding undue bias where hearing examiner found all of one side’s
witnesses trustworthy and all from the other side untrustworthy); Valley v.
Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047 (5th Cir. 1997); Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d
1397 (11th Cir. 1996); Hall v. Marion School District No. 2, 31 F.3d 183 (4th Cir.
1994); Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Riney, 21 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. 1994); Jays
Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 573 F.2d 438 (7th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 859
(1978).
57. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL
SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 30 (1983) [hereinafter BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE]
(associating the requirement that “the decisionmaker must be neutral” with the
“moral judgment” model of administrative justice).
58. This comes, in the first instance, from the inviolability of this principle in
adjudication more generally. See, e.g., JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND
SOURCES OF THE LAW 114–15 (2d ed. 1921) (“The essence of a judge’s office is that
he shall be impartial . . . .”); Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42
UCLA L. REV. 651, 679–90 (1995); Gerald Gaus, Public Reason and the Rule of
Law, in THE RULE OF LAW xxxvi, 328 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).
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criteria.59
Two influential circuit court cases from the mid-1960s,
both involving the Federal Trade Commission, are
illustrative of the wider doctrine. In Texaco, Inc. v. FTC,60
the D.C. Circuit considered the question of whether many
statements made by FTC Chair Dixon, each expressing
criticism of Texaco’s conduct, tainted the proceeding. The
core of the concern was that the Chair was wrong in voting
on this matter. “[A] disinterested reader of Chairman Dixon’s
speech,” said the court, “could hardly fail to conclude that he
had in some measure decided in advance that Texaco had
violated the Act.”61 This flaw was accompanied by concerns
that the evidentiary record was insufficient to support the
agency’s decision.62 The court invalidated the agency
proceeding on both grounds. In his dissenting opinion, Judge
Washington indicated that Dixon’s conduct alone was
sufficient to poison the process. As he wrote: “Once an
adjudicator has taken a position apparently inconsistent
with an ability to judge the facts fairly, subsequent
protestations of open-mindedness on his part cannot restore
a presumption of impartiality.”63
In American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC,64 Chair Dixon’s
conduct was again brought into question. Here the objection
the defendant company made was that in Dixon’s previous
role as Chief Counsel and Staff Director of the Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Judiciary Committee, he
59. See, e.g., Miss. Comm’n on Env’t Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138 (D.C. Cir.
2015); Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. Inc. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 663 F.3d 476 (D.C.
Cir. 2011). As the court put it in Air Transport: “Decisionmakers violate the Due
Process Clause and must be disqualified when they act with an ‘unalterably
closed mind’ and are ‘unwilling or unable’ to rationally consider arguments.” Air
Transp. Ass’n of Am, 663 F.3d at 487.
60. 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
61. Id. at 760.
62. See id. at 758, 761–62.
63. Id. at 764.
64. 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
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played an “active role” in the investigation of this company.
The Sixth Circuit found this conduct objectionable, noting
that “[T]he Commission is a fact-finding body. As Chairman,
Mr. Dixon sat with the other members as triers of the facts
and joined in making the factual determination upon which
the order of the Commission is based.”65 This conduct
violated both the APA and the Due Process clause, for “[i]t is
fundamental that both unfairness and the appearance of
unfairness should be avoided. Wherever there may be
reasonable suspicion of unfairness, it is best to disqualify.”66
The requirement of an open-minded decisionmaker has
been tempered by an acknowledgment, sometimes explicit
and other times tacit, that the administrative context is not
identical to the ordinary trial process.67 Courts have
therefore given agencies wider latitude to adjudicate against
the background of previous position-taking.68 Openmindedness need not be absolute.69 Moreover, agency
65. Id. at 767.
66. Id.
67. See generally Alan Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like
Legislatures and Courts—Except When They’re Not, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 79 (2007).
68. See, e.g., Jagers v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 758 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir.
2014) (“[S]ubjective hope” that factfinding would support a desired outcome does
not “demonstrate improper bias on the part of agency decisionmakers”); In re
United States, 542 Fed. App. 944 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (noting the high standard that
must be met before allowing inquiry of a high governmental official to determine
prejudice); In re FDIC, 58 F.3d 1055 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he fact that agency heads
considered the preferences (even political ones) of other government officials
concerning how this discretion should be exercised does not establish the required
degree of bad faith or improper behavior.”); C & W Fish Co. v. Fox, 931 F.2d 1556,
1564 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[A]n individual should be disqualified from rulemaking
‘only when there has been a clear and convincing showing that the . . . member
has an unalterably closed mind on matters critical to the disposition of the
proceeding.’”).
69. This idea is reinforced by some of our most distinguished judges. See, e.g.,
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 108 (1921) (judicial
officers “do not stand aloof on these chill and distant heights; and we shall not
help the cause of truth by acting and speaking as if they do”); In re J.P. Linahan,
Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651–52 (2d Cir. 1943) (“Interests, points of view, preferences,
are the essence of living. Only death yields complete dispassionateness, for such
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officials are entitled to a “presumption of honesty and
integrity.”70 Illustrative is FTC v. Cement Institute.71 There
the FTC had issued a detailed report to Congress in which it
described many ways in which the cement industry had used
a so-called multiple basing point system to fix prices. This
description emerged from a comprehensive investigation of
the industry. The defendant Cement Institute claimed that
this investigation and the accompanying report suggested
that the agency had an irrevocably closed mind on the key
issues in the adjudication. The Court rejected that argument,
noting that the agency was entitled to a presumption of
objectivity72 and disagreeing with the Cement Institute that
the record revealed that the “minds of [the FTC’s] members
were irrevocably closed on the subject of respondents’ basing
point practices.”73
Despite the Court’s strong support of the FTC’s decision
in this case, and its notable description of the advantage of
experience as one of its most valuable resources,74 the lower
courts have been rather undaunted in reaching judgments
on the facts of particular agency adjudications that highlight
prejudice and its risks, sometimes striking down agency
decisions on the basis of factual assessment and the integrity

dispassionateness signifies utter indifference.”); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824,
835 (1972) (“Proof that a Justice’s mind at the time he joined the Court was a
complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence
of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.”).
70. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
71. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
72. See Charles H. Koch, Prejudgment: An Unavailable Challenge to Official
Administrative Action, 33 FED. BAR J. 218, 223 (describing Cement Institute as
establishing such a presumption). This theme evolves from the presumption of
honesty and integrity that is noted in various cases involving regulatory
administration. Cf. Note, The Presumption of Regularity in Judicial Review of the
Executive Branch, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2431 (2018) (describing origins and
functions of this presumption and tying to general themes in administrative law).
73. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at 701.
74. See id. at 702.
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presumption and other times upholding the agency action.75
Three important cases, two from the D.C. Circuit and the
other from the First Circuit illustrate the courts’ different
approaches to assessing adjudicative prejudice.
In the two Cinderella Career & Finishing School cases,76
the D.C. Circuit considered statements by the FTC Chair in
the context of an adjudication involving alleged unfair or
deceptive practices in the beauty industry. The first
statement was in the form of a press release announcing the
fact of the prosecution. This the Court regarded as
acceptable, insofar as it merely alerted “the public to
suspected violations of the law by factual press releases.”77
By contrast, the statements of the Chair that spoke, as the
Court saw it, to the merits of the dispute and to the bad
conduct of the defendant crossed the line. The latitude given
to the agency to make factual statements (based on their
experience and judgment) “does not give individual
Commissioners license to prejudge cases or to make speeches
which give the appearance that the case has been
prejudged.”78 Whatever presumption of objectivity
apparently faded in the face of the court’s consternation that
the agency was, in the role as adjudicator, expressing
opinions which suggested that “the ultimate determination
of the merits will move in predestined grooves.”79
A very different outcome was reached by the First
Circuit court in Pangburn v. Civil Aeronautics Board.80
There the Civil Aeronautics Board had issued a report in a
plane crash investigation finding that the crash was the

75. Id. at 701–02.
76. FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schs., Inc. (Cinderella I), 404, F.2d
1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Cinderella Career & Finishing Schs., Inc. v. FTC
(Cinderella II), 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
77. Cinderella I, 404 F.2d at 1314.
78. Cinderella II, 425 F.2d at 590.
79. Id.
80. 311 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962).
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result of pilot error. When it next turned to the question of
whether the pilot’s license should be suspended, the pilot
objected, arguing that the agency had already made up its
mind on the core facts in the adjudication. The First Circuit
held for the Board. “We cannot say,” said the court, “that the
mere fact that a tribunal has had contact with a particular
factual complex in a prior hearing, or indeed has taken a
public position on the facts, is enough to place that tribunal
under a constitutional inhibition to pass upon the facts in a
subsequent hearing.”81
The involvement of a decisionmaker in a previous phase
of the proceeding raises special concerns, this
notwithstanding the presumption of objectivity and
integrity. The apparent problem in these settings is that
previous involvement as, say, an investigator or prosecutor,
raises the appearance that this same individual would not be
objective in adjudicating the final dispute. This was the
assumption undergirding the Supreme Court’s decision in
Williams v. Pennsylvania.82 In Williams, the chief justice of
the state supreme court, who had previously served as a
district attorney and had approved the decision to seek the
death penalty against a defendant denied defendant’s
recusal motion. The Court held that the participation of a
judge in a matter in which he had previously been involved
as a prosecutor was a constitutional “defect” under the Due
Process clause.83 This conclusion was reached, said the
Court, without any evidence that this justice had actually
been biased against the defendant and that his decision to
join the court’s opinion denying a stay of execution was due
to bias. It is the appearance of impropriety that the Court
worried about here. As the Court said:
An insistence on the appearance of neutrality is not some artificial
attempt to mask imperfection in the judicial process, but rather an

81. Id. at 358.
82. 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016).
83. Id. at 1909.
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essential means of ensuring the reality of a fair adjudication. Both
the appearance and reality of impartial justice are necessary to the
public legitimacy of judicial pronouncements and thus to the rule of
law itself.84

Lower
court
cases
involving
administrative
adjudications have likewise noted these concerns. Utica
Packing Co. v. Block is illustrative.85 In Utica, a judicial
officer who had been involved in the proceeding previously as
a prosecutor was viewed skeptically by the court, the idea
being that this experience would likely influence his
judgment as he came to consider this matter as a judge.86
The courts typically do not distinguish between the
nature and amplitude of the prejudice.87 From the reluctance
to probe the mental processes of the agency decisionmaker it
might follow that the reasons why the administrator was
prejudiced against one side in the matter should be beside
the point. After all, how would it be determined what is in
the heart and mind of the decisionmaker? However, there are
the odd cases in which the fact that the agency official had
some animosity directed toward one or another party, that
is, a view that went beyond a mere prejudice in favor of some
distinct position, seemed to drive the court toward a
particular conclusion.88

84. Id.
85. 781 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1986).
86. But not, interestingly, the APA. The court indicated that this
arrangement did not violate section 554(d). Id. at 76.
87. But see Strauss, Disqualifications, supra note 16, at 1018 (“The legislative
history of the APA provisions strongly suggests that the drafters’ concerns were
with the personal animosities and commitments arising from an investigator’s or
prosecutor’s active pursuit of a particular adversary, and not with intellectual
commitments arising out of prior consideration of an asserted fact.”).
88. Professor Strauss sees these animus factors, “the irrational
aggressiveness of personal commitment,” as driving the court in the Texaco and
Cinderella cases toward a finding of unacceptable prejudice and as providing a
basis to distinguish Cement Institute, Pangburn, and Withrow. See id. at 1025.
Elsewhere Strauss notes, considering these cases as a whole, that “it could be
suggested that much of the law of bias and disqualification involves the
enforcement of rules of decorum, the disciplining of verbal ruffians more than the
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2. The Rulemaking Puzzle
The focus on the context of adjudication in cases
involving claims of improper prejudice follows the general
lesson of Londoner/Bi-Metallic, that is, that decisionmaking
that implicates individual interests in a setting that is
analogous to ordinary adjudication is subject to due process
requirements. Rulemaking is a different animal. However,
the courts have not given a safe harbor to rulemaking.
Rather, there are prominent cases in which the courts have
mandated an open-minded decisionmaker in the rulemaking
context, albeit with different standards applied to that
setting.
The most famous example of this is Ass’n of National
Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC.89 In that case, a leading advertising
group objected to the participation of Chair Michael
Pertschuk in the proceeding that led to restrictions on
children-targeted television advertising.90 Mr. Pertschuk, a
high-profile consumer advocate in his pre-FTC career, had
made a number of public statements expressing his strong
opinion about children-focused advertising. In response to a
request from the industry to remove himself from this
attainment of actual objectivity in factfinders.” Id. at 1024.
A prominent recent example of the reliance on animus to invalidate an
administrative decision is last year’s decision by the Supreme Court in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018), the great religious liberty versus civil rights case that wasn’t. In
Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court focused on statements made by a commissioner
in a proceeding involving a baker who had refused to bake a wedding cake for a
gay couple, viewing this comment as reflecting animus and, from that, concluding
that this proceeding was improper. As Justice Kennedy said for the Court: “The
neutral and respectful consideration to which Phillips was entitled was
compromised here,” said Justice Kennedy for the Court, “[as the] Civil Rights
Commission’s treatment of his case has some elements of a clear and
impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated [the
cake shop owner’s] objection.” Id. at 1728.
89. 627 F.2d 1151 (1979), cert denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980).
90. See Strauss, Disqualifications, supra note 16, at 991; see also Thomas A.
Albright, Regulator Disqualification from Rulemaking Proceedings, 57 TEX. L.
REV. 1193 (1979).
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hearing, he declined to do so. The D.C. Circuit Court declined
to strike down the rulemaking on this basis. It held that
disqualification of the rulemaker was appropriate only where
there was “clear and convincing evidence” that an
administrator in a rulemaking proceeding had “an
unalterably closed mind on matters critical to the . . .
proceeding.”91
Two other opinions in National Advertisers spell out
starkly different perspectives on the role of prejudgment in
rulemaking circumstances. In his concurring opinion, Judge
Leventhal juxtaposed two different rulemakers, one which
comes to the agency process “with an open mind, indeed a
blank mind, a tabula rasa devoid of any previous knowledge
of the matter,” and the other who, like Mr. Pertschuk, “had
delved into the subject sufficiently to become concerned that
there was an evil or abuse that required regulatory
response.”92 Having stacked this deck, Judge Leventhal
accepts, and even embraces, Pertschuk’s participation in this
matter.93 By contrast, Judge MacKinnon in his separate
opinion, concurring and dissenting in part, decries the court’s
high standard for disqualification. Colorfully, Judge
MacKinnon worries that the majority’s opinion “would
establish a legal principle that evidence of bias and prejudice
would not be disqualifying unless it could surmount a fence
that is horse high, pig tight and bull strong.”94 In short, much
“too much protection for a biased decisionmaker.”
Although the courts have not wavered from their
blackletter statement that the requirement of impartiality
extends to rulemaking under the right set of circumstances,95

91. Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, 627 F.2d. at 1170.
92. Id. at 1176 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1188.
95. Perhaps the most obvious instance is in the case of formal rulemaking
under section 556(b) of the APA. Professor Strauss notes this requirement but
notes, somewhat equivocally, that while “the application of § 556(b) to formal
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holdings invalidating administrative actions on the grounds
that the head of the agency was improperly biased are rare.
The high bar to proving bias set in the National Advertisers
case, along with the dearth of guidance from either Supreme
Court caselaw or from the APA or other pertinent statutes,
has meant that whatever restrictions there are in the
rulemaking context are developed either internally or
through the courts’ review of agency decisions under hard
look. These represent meaningful, if incomplete and
controversial, constraints.
While courts persist in their aspiration to police
coherently the boundaries between acceptable and
unacceptable prejudice,96 the lesson to take from cases
involving prejudice in regulatory administration is that that
it is hard to formulate even a medium bright line to separate
acceptable from unacceptable bias. This is true in
rulemaking, where the law has mostly been shifted from factspecific episodes of biased decisionmakers to other sources of
law. And it is perhaps even more true for adjudication, where
the concept of the open-minded adjudicator is hard to
operationalize in the real world of complex agency
decisionmaking. Commentators generally view the doctrine
as articulating a standard, highly fact bound, that only
prejudice which is unacceptable is forbidden.97

rulemaking can certainly vary from that appropriate for adjudication,” in fact
“[n]o suggestion of such a variation appears in the agency rules, although it may
be reflected in some agencies’ practices.” Strauss, Disqualifications, supra note
16, at 1010 n.56.
96. See, e.g., Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir. 1995); Antoniu v.
SEC, 877 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
97. The presumption of integrity created by the Court in Cement Institute
has stuck out in the doctrine concerning prejudice. In Schweiker v. McClure, 456
U.S. 188 (1982), a case involving adjudication by private judges, hired by
insurance companies to determine reimbursement matters under Medicare, the
Court noted that the presumption of impartiality was a strong one and, further,
that it was principally up to Congress to construct a regime in which adjudicative
fairness and rationality would be maintained.

2021]

WHITHER THE NEUTRAL AGENCY?

399

C. Influence
Another serious threat to objective administrative
decisionmaking is the specter of outside influence, typically
by political officials, in agency adjudication or targeted
rulemaking. This is the problem of so-called “telephone
justice.” Insofar as legislators and the President interfere
with administrative outcomes, the question is whether and
to what extent such interferences to the objectivity of the
administrative process can be regulated by legal rules.98
Legislators’ efforts to interfere in pending hearings are
also viewed as especially problematic. In Pillsbury Co. v.
FTC,99 the court considered the situation in which the FTC
chair appeared before a Senate committee and was grilled by
Senators on a complex pending matter then before the
agency. “To subject the administrator to a searching
examination as to how and why he reached his decision in a
case still pending before him, and to criticize him for
reaching the ‘wrong’ decision . . . sacrifices the appearance of
impropriety—the sine qua non of American judicial justice
. . . .”100
The Pillsbury doctrine remains good law and, while it is
difficult to measure whether and to what extent legislators
have complied with its edict outside the bright lights of
formal committee hearings, it reflects a commitment to the
notion that agency officials should be free of political
interferences when matters are pending in an adjudicatory

98. See generally Jamelle C. Sharpe, Judging Congressional Oversight, 65
ADMIN. L. REV. 183 (2013); Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative
Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397 (2013); Nina A.
Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108
MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in
Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009); Peter L. Strauss,
Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 696 (2007) [hereinafter Straus, Overseer].
99. 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
100. Id. at 964.
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proceeding.101 Less clear is the circumstance of legislator or
executive official communications in proceedings which are
not adjudication but rulemaking. In D.C. Federation of Civic
Ass’ns v. Volpe,102 the D.C. Circuit invalidated a decision of
the Secretary of Interior and remanded the issue back to
Interior so that the Secretary could make a decision based
upon circumstances relevant to the statute and not on the
basis of considerations raised by the White House.103 “There
is no question,” said the Court, “that the evidence indicates
that strong political pressure was applied by certain
members of Congress in order to secure approval of the
bridge project.”104 In the end, the Court remanded the agency
action back for a more thorough record for the Court’s review.
More recent D.C. Circuit cases, including Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel,105 and Sierra Club v. Costle,106
raise the distinct possibility that DC Federation has been
interred without ceremony.107
Political influence has maintained an uneven and rather
unsteady status in the retinue of bias doctrines. Courts cite
Pillsbury as the principal case for the proposition that
Congressional influence is verboten in pending adjudicatory

101. For criticisms of the doctrine, see Jeremy Rabkin, Rulemaking, Bias, the
Dues of Due Process at the FTC, 3 REGULATION 43, 43 (1979). See also Antonin
Scalia, The Judicialization of Standardless Rulemaking: Two Wrongs Make a
Right 1 REGULATION 38 (1977) [hereinafter Scalia, Two Wrongs].
102. 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
103. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus
Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and
Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 495–98 (1990) [hereinafter Pierce, Political
Control] (criticizing Volpe’s reasoning as “a singularly arrogant decision”). See
also HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 15, § 7.7, at 906 (describing the case as
“serious judicial overreach in the name of policing bias”).
104. D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns, 459 F.2d at 1245.
105. 865 F.2d 288, 314–19 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
106. 657 F.2d 298, 408–09 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
107. See Pierce, Political Control, supra note 103, at 495 n.58 (noticing these
two cases as interpreting “the holding narrowly”).
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matters.108 And yet the federal courts have not expressly
limited this holding either just to Congress or just to
adjudication. Indeed, in cases decided over the past decade,
and thus well after Pillsbury, circuit courts have
interrogated instances of political influence, coming from
various directions, to determine whether they have crossed a
line.109 Courts very rarely disqualify agency officials for bias
or invalidate the agency’s decision. It would not be
implausible, on the one hand, to see these frequent judicial
rulings as simulacra of Pillsbury’s famous line in the sand
against aggressive and impactful legislative interference.
And yet the Pillsbury doctrine has not been narrowed. On
the contrary, courts insist that an agency proceeding can be
invalidated when political pressure is of great scope and
intensity and when it can be shown than political pressure
“shapes, in whole or in part, the judgment of the ultimate
agency decisionmaker.”
D. Beyond Bias Doctrine Tout Court: Auxiliary Precautions
The various summaries of the blackletter law by treatise
writers and the occasional Supreme Court opinion describe
the doctrine in general terms as prohibitions against biased
and prejudiced decisionmaking. However, the law regulates
biased decisionmaking in a variety of other ways. While the
focal point of this Article is on how constitutional and
administrative law ought best to regulate the behavior of
biased decisionmakers in doctrines designed for this specific
purpose, we must attend to the different, and overlapping,
ways in which contemporary law limits bias through
doctrines and structures not conventionally ascribed to bias
law as such. This is for two reasons: To understand the larger
legal landscape in which matters of bias and the resulting
108. See, e.g., ATX, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 41 F.3d 1522, 1527 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
109. See, e.g., Delgado v. Holder, 674 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 2012); Aera Energy
LLC v. Salazar, 642 F.3d 212 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v.
Kempthorne, 587 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2009).
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mistrust of administrators is constructed; and, second, to
give us a basis to evaluate normatively complements and
substitutes to standard bias/prejudice rules.
1. Ex parte communications
The prohibition against ex parte communications is
designed, like bias doctrine, to remove improper influences
from the administrative process and, too, to ensure
transparency in decisionmaking. The APA handles ex parte
communications through section 557(d).110 In formal
adjudications and rulemakings, ex parte communications
are prohibited. Further, all such communications, whether
originating inside or outside the agency, must be put into the
record.111 These prohibitions are nested in a larger
framework, in sections 556 and 557, which are designed to
ensure that the structure of the hearing and the construction
of the record meet the objectives of ensuring not only a fair,
deliberate process, but also a sufficient architecture of
information to enable the federal courts to carry out their
review functions.
The conundrum is what to do about proceedings that are
not required to follow formal, on-the-record procedures under
the APA. After all, formal proceedings—what have been
helpfully called by commentators, Type A proceedings112—
are rare; much more common are procedures that lie
somewhere in between trial-type, on-the-record hearings and
purely informal (say, for example, a university’s admission
decision). There are no statutory prohibitions against ex
parte communications in these Type B proceedings.
The courts have experimented with standards to limit,
or at least to bring into the sunshine, ex parte
communications in more informal proceedings. A leading

110. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d).
111. Id.
112. See ACUS REPORT, supra note 22, at 6–10 (describing Type A, B, & C
proceedings).
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case is Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC.113 This case involved a
complex rulemaking proceeding involving HBO and many
other pay cable companies and broadcasters. The D.C.
Circuit expressed grave concern with the ex parte contacts
made by the industry during the proceeding. The court said
Although it is impossible to draw any firm conclusions about the
effect of ex parte presentations upon the ultimate shape of the pay
cable rules, the evidence is certainly consistent with often-voiced
claims of undue industry influence over Commission proceedings,
and we are particularly concerned that the final shaping of the rules
we are reviewing here may have been by compromise among the
contending industry forces, rather than by exercise of the
independent discretion in the public interest the Communications
Act vests in individual commissioners.114

To this Court, such activity was the fatal flaw, for “the
possibility that there is here one administrative record for
the public and this Court and another for the Commission
and those ‘in the know’ is intolerable.”115 The court insisted
that the agency disclose the basis of its thinking and the
information upon which it has relied, for otherwise the
agency may be considering information which is “biased,
inaccurate, or incomplete . . . .”116 In short, it is from the
skepticism that agency might be biased that the court
demands a more comprehensive disclosure.117
In some important ways, HBO represents the high-water
mark of judicial creativity in limiting administrative choice
in order to protect a certain model of the regulatory
113. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
114. Id. at 53.
115. Id. at 54.
116. Id. at 55.
117. The court sees the proceeding through the lens of adjudication, although
the process is in fact a rulemaking. This is, as the court had said in Sangamon
Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959), a process
involving “conflicting private claims to a valuable privilege” and therefore the
court cannot tolerate “the inconsistency of secrecy with fundamental notions of
fairness implicit in due process and with the ideal of reasoned decisionmaking on
the merits which undergirds all of our administrative law.” Home Box Office Inc.,
567 F.2d at 56.
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administration as fair and transparent. The HBO decision
reeks of concern with short-sighted (although not necessarily
self-dealing) agency actions and, likewise, with a confidence
that courts can and should create standards to guide agency
action in a salutary direction. The Court’s creativity in this
case is on two levels: First, they apply standards which are
drawn from the APA by analogy, but clearly not applicable
as a matter of positive law; and, second, they connect the
rationale for limiting one-party contacts in a rulemaking
context, despite the Londoner/Bi-Metallic dichotomy
underlying the rulemaking/adjudication distinction. In all,
HBO stands for the arresting proposition that rulemaking,
even on a complex set of facts with multiple parties, calls for
objective decisionmaking, with a neutral agency open to
comments and proffers of proof in a transparent venue in
which ex parte contacts are unacceptable.
While not formally overturning HBO, the Court arrested
this development one year later in its important decision in
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources
Defense Council.118 The idea that judicial review needed a
record of sorts, and a record that would have within it a
description of ex parte contacts, is in tension with the
restrained approach the Court insisted upon in Vermont
Yankee. However—and this is a key point in understanding
the ingenuity in the D.C. Circuit’s ratio decidendi in HBO—
the holding in HBO could survive Vermont Yankee in the
sense that the court was not requiring procedures in the
specific sense, but saying that the agency’s decision would be
vulnerable to challenge if and insofar as the court feared that
there was one record for the public and one record for the
agency. In this sense, the HBO/Vermont Yankee tension
illustrates a broader, and familiar, argument about the
persistence of hard look review in a post-Vermont Yankee
world.
With respect to ex parte communications specifically, the
118. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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court did curtail the development engineered by HBO. In
Sierra Club v. Costle,119 the D.C. Circuit declined to
invalidate an agency decision based upon the claim that the
White House had engaged in improper ex parte
communications.120 The situation of informal rulemaking is
distinct, said the Court, in that it involves policy matters in
which it is appropriate for officials in the executive branch to
weigh in.121 Moreover, Congress had not, unlike in D.C.
Federation, prohibited the contacts made here. Rather, the
conversations fall under the category of what is colorfully
labelled jawboning and is a standard device by which elected
officials seek to impact agency policies.122 Different results
were reached in cases in which the facts seemed rather
similar.
One reading of this case, and others which have applied
its general framework, is that the President is given a safe
harbor in interventions into the involvement in
administrative decisionmaking processes. But this goes too
far. In Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization
(PATCO) v. Federal Labor Relations Authority,123 the D.C.
Circuit held that contacts between the Secretary of
Transportation and an agency member, even in the absence
of evidence that there were efforts to influence this decision,
was a violation of the APA. The PATCO case was meaningful

119. 657 F.2d 298 (1981).
120. Id. at 405–06.
121. Id. at 400–01.
122. See generally Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex
Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1980). As the Fifth
Circuit put it in the Yeutter case:
Congressional “interference” and “political pressure” are loaded terms.
We need not attempt a portrait of all their sinister possibilities, even if
we were able to do so. We can make plain that the force of logic and ideas
[conveyed in legislators’ contacts with agency officials] is not our
concern. They carry their own force and exert their own pressure.
DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 957 F.2d 1183, 1188 (5th Cir. 1992).
123. 685 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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in putting to rest any notion that a status check by an official
in the executive branch (whether, as in this case, a Cabinet
official or, in another case, the President himself) is different
than, say, an ex parte contact by a party to the adjudication
and, further, was an important reminder that the formal
hearing requirements in the APA, both in adjudication and
in rulemaking, apply to presidential involvement. This is not
to say that the President is or should be just another human
so far as bias law is concerned, an issue we will return to in
Part IV below.
2.Hard look review of agency decisionmaking
Judicial review under section 706 of the APA is the
principal mechanism by which courts can oversee agency
decisionmaking and thereby assure that the trust in broad
agency power is warranted. One of the key lessons drawn
from New Deal era administrative law cases and their
progeny is that agencies are obliged to provide adequate
reasons to justify administrative orders and rules.
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,124 the
Court held that the agency decisionmaker did not explain
sufficiently the rationale for the decision reached, that is, the
granting of a permit to build a road through Overton Park.
The Court rejected the argument that the dearth of prolix
legal standards for defining the scope of administrative
discretion left the reviewing courts with no law to apply and
therefore this was a decision “committed to agency by law”
under section 706 of the APA.125 Yet, in reviewing the agency
decision, the Court reiterated the injunction from the
Morgan Cases that it would be inappropriate to probe the
mental processes of the agency.126 The Court insisted that
the lower courts could nonetheless evaluate sufficiently the
agency’s decision. “The bare record,” warned the Court, “may

124. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
125. Id. at 410.
126. Id. at 420; see United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 424 (1941).
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not disclose the factors considered or the [agency’s]
construction of the evidence,”127 and so the reviewing court
may need to “examin[e] the decisionmakers” in order to
satisfy it that is not “bad faith or improper behavior.”128
Overton Park provides an important perspective on the
matter of bias and its regulation by judges. The situation
before the Court here involved a complex political dynamic,
with the engagement of stakeholders at both the local and
national level.129 Concerned about the depth of analysis by
the Secretary of Transportation, the Court might have left
the principal matters to the political process to work out.
This was, after all, not a proceeding in which a formal
hearing, or even delineated procedures short of a hearing,
were required. This was the exercise of discretion, bounded
to be sure, as the Court noted, by a cabinet officer in the
executive branch. And yet the Court, in a decision that would
become seminal in the development of the hard look review
required by appellate courts under section 706 of the APA,
choose to instruct the reviewing courts to do a searching
review. In evaluating the Court’s performance in this case,
Peter Strauss writes
The Court chose a reading that maximized the possibilities of
judicial control of agency decision through litigation, reasoning in
part that only this reading could vindicate the policies that
underlay the statute in question. The alternative reading would
have credited the possibility of effective political controls, and the
Court concluded that in the context before it these controls would
inevitably fail. Overton Park thus presents us not only with the use
of the courts as a surrogate for political action, but also with a
declaration by the Court that only the surrogate can work.130

This approach is relevant to our discussion of bias here.

127. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 420.
128. Id.
129. A valuable depiction and analysis of this political context is provided by
Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls over
Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992).
130. Id. at 1253.
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When political influence is at issue and the question is
whether and to what extent administrative officials could or
would resist this influence, the choice for the reviewing court
will be whether to entrust the political process to work this
problem out, or whether, instead, to require a review of the
proceeding, with information gleaned from the information
in the proceeding (we might not call it a record in the APA
sense of that term, but that is what it amounts to). Overton
Park takes a strong position on that choice. And, in doing so,
the Court reinforces the idea that a fair decisionmaking
process requires an agency official with an open-mind and
resistant to external pressure and her own prejudices.
The evaluation of external influence, nested in an
inquiry into what was the basis of the agency’s decision, is a
prominent part of cases following Overton Park, both in the
context of adjudication and rulemaking.131 In two classic
hard look review cases, Portland Cement Ass’n v
Ruckelshaus132 and United States v. Nova Scotia Food
Products Corp.,133 the reviewing courts insisted upon a
disclosure by the agency of “the basic data relied upon” for
its decision and also a “meaningful opportunity” to comment
on the proposed rule.134 Although not invoking concerns with
bias specifically, the underlying rationale for these
requirements is that the agency based its decision on the
information submitted in the proceeding, and not on

131. Overton Park’s analogue, as the foundational case involving section 706
review of informal rulemaking, is Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). State Farm is not only a
rulemaking case, but also a sweeping injunction to lower courts to engage in
suitably searching review to ensure that the agency decision is reasonable and
there is adequate support in the information before the agency for its choice. In
commenting on both cases, Lisa Bressman notes that the “Court in both of the
cases intimated a concern that the lawmaking reflected ideological or private
interests at public expense . . . .” Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation
After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452 (2002).
132. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
133. 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
134. Id. at 252.
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improper considerations (political or otherwise).
“Improper” here, as in bias law generally, is a term of art.
What external considerations are improper rests on
judgments that emerge, first, from what the statute demands
and prohibits and, second, the standards that are set out by
reviewing courts in order to determine whether an agency
decision is unreasonable and therefore violates the APA. A
tension in the caselaw involves how best to reconcile the
agency’s expertise, particularly in technical/scientific
matters, with the interest of affected groups in participating
in the proceeding and seeking to persuade the agency to take
one path or another. Although this point goes unstated, this
effort under scope of review doctrine aims to assess what
amount of bias (read: the agency making up its mind
regardless of the input of outsiders) is optimal.
A subtext of the Court’s foundational modern hard look
case, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co,135 is that the political
circumstances underlying President Reagan’s new
Transportation Department raised red flags about the
rationale for the decision to suspend the airbags
requirement. The Court worried that the agency had given
“no consideration whatsoever to modifying the Standard” in
order to meet the concerns that the agency advanced for
abandoning this standard in the aftermath of President
Reagan’s election (on a deregulatory platform).136 In the end,
the Court declared, “the agency’s explanation for rescission
of the passive restraint requirement is not sufficient to
enable us to conclude that the rescission was the product of
reasoned decisionmaking.”137 This demand for reasoned
decisionmaking was the takeaway lesson from the Court. It
reflected a renewal of the Court’s hard look requirement and
an injunction to probe the agency’s decisional rationale to
135. 463 U.S. 29.
136. Id. at 46.
137. Id. at 52.

410

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

assure that it was reason, not politics or other improper
considerations, that undergirded the final regulatory choice.
While State Farm does not stand for the broad
proposition that the agency decision must be free from
politics, it does create a legal speed bump by virtue of the
courts’ responsibility for searching scrutiny into the
reasoning the agency’s decision.138 The tension that emerges,
and that Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion brings to the
surface,139 is the role of the president as an avowed interest
group in the procedure and the result of the agency’s action
in an environment in which we believe that agency decisions
should be based upon an objective assessment of the facts
and law, and in a process in which agency decisionmakers
have an open mind and are free from improper outside (or
inside) influences. State Farm illustrates this tension, but
does not resolve it.
An example of an important court, the D.C. Circuit,
struggling with this tension in modern administrative law is
American Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC.140 In that case, a
group of licensed amateur radio operators complained about
the FCC’s reliance on myriad studies, all heavily redacted,
by the agency’s own engineers and also the Commission’s

138. Political scientist Martin Shapiro cuts to the chase and describes the
Court’s decision in light of the political landscape:
The Supreme Court told the Reagan administration that it could not
eliminate the existing Democratic rule on auto safety passenger
restraints unless it made a new rule synoptically . . . [and] [t]hey were
deprived of the option of having no rule at all and leaving their statutory
duty to provide auto safety unfulfilled.
MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATION 166 (1988) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?].
139. As Justice Rehnquist summarizes his position: “A change in
administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly
reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of
its programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within the bounds
established by Congress . . . .” Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 59
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
140. 524 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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refusal to consider empirical evidence which, they claim,
would contradict the FCC engineers’ findings. The court
agreed with the petitioner’s claim, noting voluminous cases
requiring the disclosure, as part of the “notice and comment”
requirements under the APA, of these technical studies so as
to give interested persons the opportunity to respond. The
term “prejudice” is invoked as part of the standard to
determine whether a petitioner was truly disadvantaged by
the agency’s failure to disclose this information.141 As Judge
Tatel emphasized in his concurring opinion, this
requirement grows directly out of the imperative that the
court review the “whole record” of the proceeding.142 This
review, as the Court had made in State Farm, is essential to
ensure that the agency is disclosing the real bases upon
which it has reached its decision; and, correlatively, that it
has not acted improperly in this process. Judge Kavanaugh,
in his dissent, raises directly the question whether Portland
Cement,143 as an exemplar of the D.C. Circuit’s creative
approach to intervening in informal administrative
proceedings, is grounded in the APA and is consistent with
Vermont Yankee. He answers no to both questions.144 While
tea-leave readers have seen this dissent, and other opinions
by Judge Kavanaugh during his long career on the D.C.
Circuit, as revealing his commitment to a novel version of socalled APA originalism,145 the nub of the issue revealed well
141. Id. at 237 (citing Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2002) for
the proposition that “the court will not set aside a rule absent a showing by the
petitioners ‘that they suffered prejudice from the agency’s failure to provide an
opportunity for public comment’”).
142. Id. at 243 (Tatel, J., concurring).
143. Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
144. He summarizes his criticism as follows: “[C]ourts simultaneously have
grown State Farm’s ‘narrow’ § 706 arbitrary-and-capricious review into a far
more demanding test. Application of the beefed-up arbitrary-and-capricious test
is inevitably if not inherently unpredictable—so much so that, on occasion, the
courts’ arbitrary-and-capricious review itself appears arbitrary and capricious.”
Am. Radio Relay League, 524 F.3d at 247 (Kavanaugh J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
145. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Judge Kavanaugh on Administrative
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by this judicial debate in American Radio Relay League is
how much latitude to give agencies in proceedings involving
difficult technical matters, matters about which we expect
them to be expert and to manifest this expertise by
conducting scientific studies and crafting solutions around
information to which they have special access and about
which they have unique knowledge.
The import of hard look review in the service of the
obligation under section 706 to make sure that agency
decisions are neither arbitrary nor capricious in informal
proceedings is not entirely clear. For one thing, the court
generally does not substitute this review for investigations
into bias. An agency decision might pass muster under the
APA, but still be fatally flawed because of a biased
decisionmaker; and the reverse can happen also, with the
decisionmaker’s behavior being proper under bias standards,
but the agency’s decision falling short. Second, there is the
question whether hard look review is so hard after all. Some
have suggested that the imposition on regulatory
administration has long been exaggerated; 146 others suggest
that the tide has turned after the heyday of the State Farm
doctrine.147 So, to know whether hard look review has, can,
and should be a meaningful supplement to, or substitute for,
the bias doctrine in addressing improper agency behavior we
need to have an informed opinion about whether hard look
review has truly mattered much at all.

Law and Separation of Powers, SCOTUSBLOG, (July 26, 2018, 2:55 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/kavanaugh-on-administrative-law-andseparation-of-powers/. On the revival of APA originalism more generally, see, for
example, Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive
Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908 (2017); Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory
and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1207 (2015).
146. See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH.
L. REV. 1355 (2016).
147. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative
Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1779 (2007) [hereinafter Bressman, Procedures
as Politics].
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3. Separation of Functions
These difficulties in assessing facts and circumstances
which tease out closed from open-mindedness in a particular
adjudication explains why commentators have urged upon
courts more structural protections. Establishing a
requirement of a separation of functions between
investigators/prosecutors and adjudicators has been the
principal recommendation. As Professor Michael Asimow
has put it in his draft report to the Administrative
Conference of the United States, “best practices require
adherence to the separation of functions concept.”148 More
than a half century earlier, Dean Landis made a similar plea
to establish a requirement of separation of functions, this
directed to President-Elect Kennedy.149 And these
suggestions have recurred from time to time in our
administrative history.150
At present, however, the Court has not required
separation of functions in an administrative setting as a
matter of Due Process. The classic case in this area is
Withrow v. Larkin.151 Withrow involved a decision of a state
medical examining board which had the authority to
investigate a doctor for misconduct and, having found
misconduct, conduct a proceeding to revoke the doctor’s
148. ACUS REPORT, supra note 22, at 18.
149. See JAMES M. LANDIS, REP. ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENTELECT (Comm. Print 1960). Landis tied these observations to a general concern
about partiality and informal process and made recommendations which
included a strengthening of the separation of functions within the agencies. See
also MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
211 (1955) (expressing concerns about the “standards of due process at the level
of the commission” and the “rather casual and frequently unsystematic” quality
of administrative hearings).
150. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COUNC. ON EXEC. ORG., A NEW
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
AGENCIES (1971) (recommending an administrative court); The PRESIDENT’S
COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES (1937) (recommending against agencies being given both
adjudicative and prosecutorial responsibilities).
151. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
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license. The claim was that combining these functions
violated procedural due process. The Court rejected this
claim, noting that the structure of this process, whether or
not sensible, was to be determined by the legislature and
“does not, without more, constitute a due process
violation.”152 Likewise, in Hortonville Joint School District
No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Ass’n,153 the Court rejected
the claim that the participation by a school board in a
proceeding to evaluate teachers’ conduct was improper and
that a separation of functions between the board and an
“impartial” decisionmaker was not constitutionally
required.154 Withrow and Hortonville have persisted as key
doctrinal underpinning of the notion that separation of
functions is not constitutionally mandated.155
So far as the separation of functions are concerned, we
may be at a fork in the road.156 The steady move away from
trial-type hearings in administrative adjudications and
anything but the most formal of rulemaking processes is
accompanied by a weakening of structural prohibitions on
the combination of functions within an agency. Withrow was
important in making a statement that the Court would not
require a strict separation as a matter of due process, and
the Court pushed along this deference to legislative
judgment in Vermont Yankee three years later. The
reluctance to “ossify” the administrative process through
formal structures is a prominent theme in modern
152. Id. at 58.
153. 426 U.S. 482 (1976). See generally Strauss, Disqualifications, supra note
16, at 1011–02.
154. The Court in Hortonville distinguished this case from the circumstances
involving a parole officer in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
155. See generally HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 15, § 7.8, at 909–23.
(describing lower court cases which have so held).
156. And perhaps not such a new road fork. The debate over the separation of
functions in regulatory administration is an old one. See Michael Asimow, When
the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal Administrative
Agencies, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 759 (1981); William F. Pedersen, Jr., The Decline of
Separation of Functions in Regulatory Agencies, 64 VA. L. REV. 991 (1978).
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administrative law literature.157 On the other hand, the
revival of what Jeff Pojanowski calls a neoclassical
administrative law, and a growing sense of mistrust of
agency decisionmakers, may push in the other direction.158
It will be important to see what exactly the Supreme Court
and the circuit courts do with separation of powers and hard
look review in the next few years. Mandating some structural
separations to counteract biases in favor of broad regulation,
and what is often seen as the liberal regulatory agenda might
be on the table.
4. The Constitutional Separation of Powers
At the heart of our constitutional scheme of separation
of powers is a commitment to a diffusion of authority and of
responsibility, to ensure that governmental power is limited
and that ambition counteracts ambition.159 With respect to

157. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the
Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume
and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414 (2012); Anne Joseph
O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern
Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889 (2008); Thomas O. McGarity, Some
Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992).
158. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L.
REV. 852, 903 (2020) (“In contrast to the pragmatist . . . the neoclassicist
endeavors to maintain a neater, more formal separation of powers, within the
context of modern governance.”). One of the more interesting threads in the
literature is the argument, in a series of articles, by Professor Kent Barnett
against administrative judges and the structure of agency adjudication. See Kent
Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643 (2016); Kent
Barnett, Why Bias Challenges to Administrative Adjudication Should Succeed,
81 MO. L. REV. at 1023, 1024 (“[P]artiality challenges fit comfortably within the
Court’s penchant for formalism and prophylaxes in structural constitutional
matters.”); Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797
(2013). While I cannot do justice to Professor Barnett’s extensive, carefully
argued thesis in this footnote, I will just note that the gist of his argument is that
the influence by the agency over AJs compromise the independence of these
adjudicators and give rise to serious Due Process and Separation of Powers
problems.
159. See generally M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS (2d ed. 1998); John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary
Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939 (2011) (describing how formalist and
functionalist approaches to separation of powers fail to capture the balance and
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administrative agencies in particular, the Court has made
clear that Congress and the President must have adequate
means and mechanisms to control agencies, and that the
structure of statutes must fulfill the Constitution’s duty of
checks and balances.160 This is implemented through a
combination of devices, including limitations on the scope of
agency discretion through delegation and, more plausibly in
the modern era, statutory constraints. It is also assured
through the protection of the President’s prerogative and
authority to manage regulatory administration under the
logic that agencies are exercising what is fundamentally
executive power.
Separation of powers in structure and in implementation
through judicial review is a means of maintaining trust in
the system. Post-New Deal, agencies are given a wide berth;
they exercise public power under established constitutional
authority; and their judgments are of legal force in a
framework which is designed to limit and channel discretion,
not so much to reduce the domain in which they govern, but
to assure that they are operating under appropriate
procedures and subject to legal checks. However meaningful
are the ex-post constraints on agency action, it is ultimately
to institutional structure and the separation of powers that
we look to maintain a coherent system that can help
maintain the trust that is essential to public accountability
and democratic legitimacy.
Bias and prejudice lie behind the surface of these
structural constraints. Separation of powers supposes that
agencies will make decisions that reflect the best evidence
and interpretation, and thus acting in ways consistent with
the rationale for permitting meaningful delegations of
authority in the first instance; and, further, it supposes that
compromises in the document and the blending of powers); Peter L. Strauss, The
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 597 (1984).
160. For a summary of the extensive doctrine, see JOHN F. MANNING &
MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 434–700 (3d ed. 2017).
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the political branches, Congress and the President, will
fulfill their duties of checking and balancing regulatory and
administrative power to assure that agencies are acting
within the proper legal guardrails. Bias in this account is the
responsibility of Congress and the President to curtail.
The last four decades has witnessed an important
tension in the Court’s jurisprudence between a more
formalist approach, one which more often than not leads the
Court to invalidate a certain arrangement as inconsistent
with the separation of powers, and a more functionalist
approach, which does the opposite.161 So far as the
constitutional authority of Congress to establish regulatory
schemes, the Court has made clear repeatedly, in cases
under the so-called nondelegation doctrine, that such
delegations are permissible under certain conditions.162 By
contrast, on the issue of presidential control over agency
structure and performance and Congressional efforts to limit
this control or to undertake their own mechanisms of control,
constitutional adjudication reveals meaningful holdings
from different directions and with different implications.163
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting
Oversight Board,164 the Court struck down the dual layer of
161. See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in
Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (2001); Peter L. Strauss,
Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987).
162. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001);
Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
163. But see VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION, supra note 3, at 86 (“[F]or the most
part, putting aside . . . loose oversight, law has abnegated to the agencies
authority over the separation of powers itself.”).
164. 561 U.S. 477 (2010). The Court’s rationale was as follows
Without the ability to oversee the Board, or to attribute the Board’s
failings to those whom he can oversee, the President is no longer the
judge of the Board’s conduct. He can neither ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed, nor be held responsible for a Board member’s breach
of faith. If this dispersion of responsibility were allowed to stand,
Congress could multiply it further by adding still more layers of goodcause tenure. Such diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of
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insulation of Board officers from Presidential scrutiny.
Underlying the Court’s holding was an insistence, echoing
arguments that go back to the early presidential removal
cases, that there be the appropriate set of political checks on
administrative agency decisionmaking. Insulation, in the
form that Congress aspired to accomplish with this novel
dual removal scheme, was viewed as at odds with these
important checks.165 In a similar vein, the Court in Lucia v.
SEC,166 invalidated the scheme for appointing ALJs on the
grounds that these ALJs were “officers of the United States”
and therefore must be appointed by the President or another
delegated officer of the United States.
Neither decision is a major threat to the constitutional
status of administrative agencies.167 Moreover, both
statutory arrangements can be corrected to ensure that the
proper lines of constitutional authority among the branches
can be demarcated. However, the principal lesson of these
two cases, and other, less notable, separation of powers
rulings at the Supreme Court and lower court level in recent
years, is that the courts have mechanisms available to limit
the capacity of agency officials to wander from the
environment appropriate for fact-specific and policy-oriented
decisionmaking.
As with bias doctrine generally, the principal driving
force behind the Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence
concerning agencies is trust. That is, it is important to
establish safeguards—auxiliary precautions—to limit selfdealing of agencies and also the manipulation of the process
by Congress.
accountability; without a clear and effective chain of command, the
public cannot determine where the blame for a pernicious measure
should fall. The Act’s restrictions are therefore incompatible with the
Constitution’s separation of powers.
Id. at 479.
165. See id.
166. 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
167. See generally VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION, supra note 3.
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Disentangling bias doctrine at a medium level of
generality, along with exploring in less detail some of the
auxiliary precautions which exist and persist to regulate
improper bias in administrative decisionmaking, just brings
us to the real beginning of our inquiry.
Taken as a whole, there is not a synthetic body of bias
doctrines, but a myriad collection of doctrines that aim
toward a fair and rational process of agency decisionmaking.
To be sure, there are other sources of law that bear on these
questions, including procedural due process under the
Constitution, the APA, and other legal statutes. There is also
the rather amorphous and capacious administrative common
law.
A key problem is with the underlying rationale for the
judicial interventions. As said in the introduction of this
Article, the essential difficulty with bias rules in regulatory
administration is that they are aimed at the wrong question;
they look to an ideal of neutrality and the open-minded
decisionmaker, and, with this, elide considerations and
perspectives which are better suited to an understanding of
the functions of administrative decisionmakers in our
complex administrative system. In the next Part, we will
focus directly on the reasons underlying why we have this set
of doctrines, and why we endeavor to limit bias through
judicial rules in our administrative state.
III. WHY DOES ADMINISTRATOR BIAS MATTER?
Bias law rests on a skeptical view of agency performance
in the shadow of broad administrative discretion; and it
likewise rests on a strong normative view about the proper
functioning of agencies and administrators. This view
emphasizes two values: adjudicatory fairness and
administrative rationality. These values, while deeply
embedded, remain inchoate in interesting and important
ways. To understand what to make of bias law, we need to
better understand how threats to the quintessential neutral
administrator in turn threaten adjudicatory fairness and
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administrative rationality.
A. Adjudicatory Fairness
We begin with the fundamental question of why exactly
is biased decisionmaking objectionable. In a legion of bias
cases, courts aim to ferret out threats to the basic idea of
objective judgment by a neutral decisionmaker. This ideal
emerges from the deeper commitment to blind justice, that
is, to decisionmaking based upon the quality of the
arguments made and the proof established, and without
attention to the characteristics of the disputants. This ideal
is actualized principally through the Constitution’s Due
Process clause; but on occasion the courts turn to the
penumbra of the APA’s procedural requirements in informal
proceedings to find a there there.
In writing about bureaucratic justice and welfare
administration over three decades ago, Jerry Mashaw
summarized the requirement of fairness as the centerpiece
of the “moral judgment” model of decisionmaking.168 On this
model, clients deserve a decisionmaker who is unbiased, and
is committed to getting the facts right. The commitment to
an open-minded adjudicator grows from the idea that these
bureaucratic processes should be fundamentally fair, and
viewed as such,169 to individuals and organizations who come
before the government for a hearing and a decision.170
Edward Rubin locates procedural fairness in our
commitment to the rule of law, “that is, the treatment of
individuals in accordance with legal standards” and the
imperative of limiting “the power of state officials.”171 This
168. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 57, at 29–31 (1983).
169. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
170. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); United States v. Morgan,
313 U.S. 409 (1941); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964). See generally
EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE
MODERN STATE 251–55 (2005) [hereinafter RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT].
171. See Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF.
L. REV. 1044, 1103, 1106 (1994) [hereinafter Rubin, Due Process]. In this article,
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power, if left unchecked by due process requirements, would
threaten the dignity of individuals who encounter state
power, and, in the context of benefits administration in
particular, dependent upon state power and discretion.172
Fairness assures that they will be able make their case.173
The intuition behind adjudicatory fairness is both
powerful and influential.174 Who can be in favor of an unfair
process? Where we can increase the fairness of the process,
why would we hesitate? Yet, there is less to the connection
between bias and adjudicatory unfairness than meets the
eye. First, the connection of this requirement to due process
is shaky. The procedural due process hook has eroded, along
with the strong due process formalism characteristic of an
earlier era. And, without that, there is precious little by way
of positive law to support this wide-ranging doctrine. Second,
there are good reasons to distinguish between the nature and
objectives of administrative adjudication and the modal case
of ordinary adjudication from which the core ideas of
adjudicatory fairness and the impartial decisionmaker
Rubin ties the rule of law value to a general concern with decisionmaking
accuracy. He writes: “The concern, therefore, must be that an inaccurate decision
impinges on some basic value, the constitutional significance of which is defined
either independently, or in terms of other values, or in terms of a democracy’s
inability to protect it.” Id. at 1103. As the quotation suggests, the connection
between accuracy and the rule of law is a rather elliptical one. And he concedes
in this same discussion that this is not the way that most scholars see the values
of due process. But the argument is nonetheless an intriguing one, and we will
return to it later in this section.
172. For a classic description of this “dignitary” view, see Sanford H. Kadish,
Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication—A Survey and Criticism,
66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
173. An early, influential effort to put the whole of administrative hearings
into this framework of the opportunity to be heard is Kenneth Culp Davis, The
Requirement of Opportunity to be Heard in the Administrative Process, 51 YALE
L.J. 1093 (1942).
174. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory
Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986);
Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive
Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1978); see also Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
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emerge. Third, and relatedly, adjudicatory fairness rests on
judgments that are complicated and contingent and, in
particular, are connected to larger goals of our system of
regulatory administration. Influential thinkers about
adjudication understood that; but courts designing bias law
apparently never got that memo.
1. Due Process Agonistes
Bias law is ancient, as old as the common law itself, and
perhaps older. And yet it is not until Gibson v. Berryhill in
1973, that the Supreme Court declared that pecuniary selfinterest on the part of an agency decisionmaker—in that
case, a board of optometry—is a basis for disqualification
under the Constitution. Thin on analysis and mostly relying
upon the judgment reached below by the district judge,
Gibson did not spell out a test for determining when
pecuniary self-interest or other forms of prejudice was
improper under due process. Nor did the Court explain why
administrator bias violates norms of fairness. It was enough
for the Court, and also for the great administrative law
treatise writers, to see Gibson as merely following in the
footsteps of classic judicial bias cases, those reiterating the
proposition that judges ought not to be deciders in their own
cause.
Fairness in administrative adjudication came to the
forefront in the early 1970s with the Supreme Court’s
watershed decision in Goldberg v. Kelly.175 In Goldberg, the
Court insisted on a set of trial-type procedures necessary
before benefits to a claimant could be terminated. The
fundamental right to be heard under the Constitution
“require[s] that a recipient have timely and adequate notice
detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an
effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse
witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and

175. 397 U.S. 254 (1969). See generally Rubin, Due Process, supra note 171, at
1060–65.

2021]

WHITHER THE NEUTRAL AGENCY?

423

evidence orally.”176 This obligation was intended not merely
to reassure a claimant that she would have her day in court,
but also to ensure that the agency’s decision would be based
upon “the legal rules and evidence adduced at the
hearing.”177
No two ways about it, Goldberg reflected a considerable
expansion in the scope of procedures required in
administrative proceedings where a claimant was at risk of
losing benefits.178 And this widening was celebrated by a
large chorus of scholars,179 including scholars who worried
about the modern faceless bureaucracy and the dependence
of clientele on discretionary decisionmaking by agencies.180
A commitment to a strong notion of fairness in all kinds of

176. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267–68.
177. Id. at 277 (citing Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292 (1937)); see
United States v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 288–289 (1924).
178. Perhaps even more significant than the delineation of procedures required
in this benefits setting was the move to regard claims for government benefits as
entitlements worthy of protection as “property” under the due process clause. In
this respect, Goldberg echoed the arguments of Charles Reich and Frank
Michelman who had pushed for a broadened protection for economically
vulnerable individuals in the welfare state. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7
(1969) [hereinafter Michelman, Protecting the Poor]; Charles A. Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965)
[hereinafter Reich, Individual Rights]. The foundational article in this
developing theory was Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733
(1964).
179. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Other Goldberg, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND PUBLIC VALUES 229–44 (Michael J. Meyer & William
A. Parent eds., 1992); Sylvia A. Law, Some Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly at
Twenty Years, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 805 (1990); Stephen Wizner, Passion in Legal
Argument and Judicial Decisionmaking: A Comment on Goldberg v. Kelly, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 179 (1988).
180. Critical to this development was the work of prominent scholars who
urged on the Supreme Court a broader set of protections for welfare beneficiaries
and the poor in general. See, e.g., FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD,
REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1971); MICHAEL
HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1962); see also
Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra note 178; Reich, Individual Rights, supra
note 178; William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction
in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
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adjudication resonated to a Court that was expanding the
reach of due process and, as well, was copasetic with a federal
judiciary which was steadily increasing the procedural
requirements imposed on agencies.
The main objection to the administrative procedures
which gave rise to Goldberg was that they did not offer an
adequate opportunity to introduce evidence and crossexamine witnesses. Pre-Goldberg, benefits hearings were
largely a black box. The procedures provided were fairly
distinct from what disputants would see at trial; and they
were constructed largely by the agencies themselves, without
resort to the APA or other “framework statutes.”181 Issues
involving the basis of an adjudicator’s judgment were not
central to the decision, except insofar as the Court insisted
that the decision must be based on the legal rules and
evidence adduced at the hearing. The issue of impartiality
was largely an afterthought, appearing in a statement at the
very end of opinion: “And, of course, an impartial
decisionmaker is essential.”182 No other comment on the
value and function of an impartial decisionmaker is offered
in Goldberg, and, perhaps tellingly, the Court in Gibson does
not cite Goldberg even once.
Nor did the issue of impartiality in administrative
adjudication feature into the Court’s reasoning in the postGoldberg due process cases.183 Most importantly, in Mathews
181. On framework statutes, see Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of
Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717 (2005).
182. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 254, 271 (emphasis added). The “of course”
in this context is baffling, for there is nothing to explain why a decisionmaker
who is free from pecuniary self-interest is to be disqualified because she is in
some sense left undefined “partial.” Of the just two cases cited for the proposition
that an impartial decisionmaker is essential, one, in re Murchison, involved a
comingling of functions in the context of an ordinary judicial proceeding and the
other was a case decided squarely under the APA, where the comingling of
functions of a prosecutor and judge were found to be in violation of the
requirements for formal adjudicatory under that statute.
183. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972). See generally Rubin, Due Process, supra note 171, at 1060–70.
Although, to be sure, some of this depends upon how exactly you define the issue
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v. Eldridge,184 the Court insisted on an assessment of costs
and benefits in determining which procedures were required.
The specific question before the Court in Mathews is whether
the absence of an evidentiary hearing, with formal
procedures delineated in Goldberg, were required before the
termination of benefits. The Court said no, providing a
notable and ultimately influential multi-factored test to use
to assess the efficacy and the legality of the procedures
established by statute and agency choice.185
While the Court did not speak about the value of
administrator impartiality specifically, and so left intact its
holding in Goldberg that an impartial decisionmaker is “of
course” required and in Gibson that pecuniary self-interest
is constitutionally prohibited, it did go to some length to
criticize the notion that the administrative process should be
subject to trial-type procedures. The Court stated
We reiterate the wise admonishment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
that differences in the origin and function of administrative
agencies “preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of
of “adjudicative impartiality.” For an interesting case regarding this, see
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). That case involved a challenge
to a proceeding where police officers had put up posters in liquor states with
individuals’ pictures on them and the phrase “excessive drinking.” The Court
considered whether this badge of dishonor and stigma required notice and an
opportunity to be heard. It held that yes it did and, while the principal
significance of the case is in its indication that a liberty interest was implicated
here, we could read it as assuming sub silentio that the value of the hearing is
that it would provide the individual with a neutral decisionmaker who could
evaluate whether the person was in fact an excessive drinker, without simply
accepting the characterization of the police department.
184. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
185. Due process, said the Court, requires
identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and, finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
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procedure, trial, and review which have evolved from the history
and experience of courts.186 The judicial model of an evidentiary
hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective, method
of decisionmaking in all circumstances. The essence of due process
is the requirement that “a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be
given] notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.”187

The only requirement, as Justice White put it in Wolff v.
McDonnell,188 in a line subsequently made famous by Judge
Henry Friendly, was for “some kind of a hearing.”189 It
remained open after Mathews whether this hearing would
necessarily require an administrator who would be impartial
in all the senses reflected in current bias doctrines.
Relevant to this story as well is the Court’s decision, two
years after Mathews, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.190 Vermont
Yankee takes place against the background for a growing
effort on the part of the lower courts, with the D.C. Circuit in
the lead, to impose procedural requirements on agencies
beyond what APA or the Constitution required. These
included informal adjudications and rulemakings, what had
become by the 1970’s, the most common settings in which
administrators exercised power under their organic statutes.
While not singling out bias law in particular, the Court’s
exasperation with the D.C. Circuit’s expansion of procedural
guarantees was an unmistakable warning that imposing a
spate of “fairness” guarantees was inconsistent with the
proper role of courts.191

186. Id. at 348 (citing FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940)).
187. Id. at 348 (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–
72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
188. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
189. See Friendly, Hearing, supra note 16.
190. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
191. The significance of Vermont Yankee for administrative law is captured
well in the literature over the four decades following the decision. Two articles
written at very different points in time illustrate this thematic continuity. See
Pojanowski, supra note 158, at 864; Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA,
the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345 (1978).
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In the end, the Goldberg expansion of procedural due
process proved to be just one chapter in a longer story.192 This
due process development was interdicted in important
respects by the Court in later cases, not only in Mathews, but
in Board of Regents v. Roth,193 and other courses that
clarified that due process was triggered only by a discernible
liberty or property interest, one found in positive law.194 This
development had the effect, if not the purpose, of eroding due
process as a big constraint on agency adjudication in the
benefits and regulatory governance area.
Heckler v. Campbell,195 is an important illustration of the
Court’s post-Mathews approach to procedural due process in
the administrative context. In Campbell, the Court heard a
challenge to a matrix which the Social Security
Administration had put together in order to aid ALJs to
determining eligibility for worker’s compensation benefits.
This structure was meant to limit agency discretion and, in
essence, to introduce a technocratic element into what had
been a more human-centered process. Despite the statutory
requirement of a hearing, the Court rejected the claim that
an individual’s inability to introduce into the proceeding
facts particular to her constituted a due process violation. As
Justice Powell wrote: “Where . . . the statute expressly

192. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1890 (2017) [hereinafter Vermeule, Deference]. See also VERMEULE, LAW’S
ABNEGATION, supra note 3, at 87–124.
193. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). On Roth, see Rubin, Due Process, supra note 171, at
1066 (“Roth did much more than repudiate Goldberg. Goldberg had assessed the
individual’s interest only to determine the proper timing of due process rights
whose basic existence was conceded. In shifting from the weight of the interest to
the nature of the interest, Roth also shifted from the question of when the hearing
was required to the question of whether the hearing was required at all”).
194. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 321 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972). See generally Rubin, Due Process, supra note 171, at 1065–83
(summarizing Roth and its doctrinal and analytical aftermath); William Van
Alystne, Cracks in “The New Property”: Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977).
195. 461 U.S. 458 (1983).
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entrusts the Secretary with the responsibility for
implementing a provision by regulation, review is limited to
determining whether the regulations promulgated exceeded
the Secretary’s statutory authority and whether they are
arbitrary and capricious.”196 Campbell represents not only a
strong statement of deference to Congress and the agency,
but also an acknowledgment that “some kind of a hearing”
can indeed be something much less than a trial-type
proceeding in which evidence is introduced and the
decisionmaker comes to the process with an open-mind,
ready to make a retail judgment on the facts before her.197
Viewed as a whole, these cases illustrate how the Court
retreated from its broad approach to procedural due process
in regulatory administration.198 As well, the Court in
Vermont Yankee admonished lower courts to stop inventing
new administrative procedures and requiring agencies to
follow them.199 While, as a doctrinal matter, none of the

196. Id. at 465.
197. The Supreme Court and lower courts have affirmed this choice for
rulemaking strategies to narrow the scope of discretion, and therefore hearings,
in matters in which agency officials would be compelled to make individualized
determinations. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230 (2001) (prison early release
context); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991) (permitting reliance on
a regulation where statute requires judgment “in each case”); Nuclear Info. Res.
Serv. V. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 969 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating that
requiring more procedure to be attached would replace the NRC’s position with
that of a “hardly expert” court); Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the application of the grid is not discretionary); Cosby v. Ward, 843
F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1988) (state employment department permitted to use “rules
of thumb” to determine eligibility for employment benefits). See generally Jon C.
Dubin, Overcoming Gridlock: Campbell After a Quarter-Century and
Bureaucratically Rational Gap-Filling in Mass Justice Adjudication in the Social
Security Administration’s Disability Programs, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 937 (2010).
198. Professor Vermeule concisely summarizes the doctrine: “[C]ourts will
relegate themselves to the institutional margins, reviewing agencies’ execution
of the Mathews calculus rather than performing it themselves.” Vermeule,
Deference, supra note 192, at 1893.
199. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435
U.S. 519, 525 (1978) (“[A]dministrative agencies . . . will be in a better position
than federal courts or Congress itself to design procedural rules adapted to the
peculiarities of the industry and the tasks of the agency involved.”).
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cornerstone bias cases have been overturned or even
deliberately narrowed, it is notable that the Supreme Court
has rarely spoken on bias in administrative adjudication,
even though administrative adjudication remains ubiquitous
and lower courts still issue decisions steadily in this
domain.200 High octane proceduralization in the
administrative process had its heyday in the GoldbergGibson era. When considered in light of the evolution of due
process generally, the adjudicatory fairness rationale for
prohibitions against partial agency decisionmakers became
a weak constitutional anchor.
Ultimately, it is hard to make sense of the due process
retrenchment illustrated by Roth, Mathews, and Campbell
(not to mention Vermont Yankee, albeit as a nonconstitutional case) without seeing that the Court was
reticent to imprint a model of judicial procedure onto the
administrative process. The open-minded decisionmaker
may be the most important quality of fairness in the sense
central to the Court’s holding in Goldberg. However, these
requirements are interlocking, in both substance and in
purpose. The Court doesn’t rank these requirements, with an
eye toward drawing a bright line between the procedures
that are fairness requirements under due process and those
that are generally good ideas, but not constitutionally
required. Rather, as it made clear in Mathews, the
assessment builds on the idea that there are tradeoffs at
work when additional procedures are mandated and, further,
administrative adjudication implicates values, interests, and
objectives that are distinct from civil and criminal trials.
Viewed from the vantage point of nearly a half of century of
administrative innovation since Goldberg, the best way to
200. And when they have spoken about due process in the administrative
context, they have often equivocated on the questions of what procedures are
required. See, e.g., Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 199 (1982) (“[D]ue process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.” (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972))); cf. Friedman
v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1979) (calling for a contextual analysis); see
Vermeule, Deference, supra note 192, at 1904–05 (discussing Schweiker).
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look at these due process developments is to see them as
connected to an evolving vision of regulatory administration
and adjudication in the modern administrative state. In the
remainder of this section on adjudicatory fairness, I explore
this vision in more detail.
2. Adjudication and administration
The claim that adjudicatory fairness requires a steely
commitment to impartiality in administrative adjudication
best assured through bias doctrine is a questionable claim.
Intuitively appealing and deeply embedded in our
administrative law, the fairness impartiality idea provides
an incomplete roadmap to legal regulation of administrative
practice.
We start with the character of the administrative
adjudicatory process. The process has long been understood
to be a unique mechanism for the implementation of public
policy. New Deal era scholars of the administrative state,
James Landis and Felix Frankfurter most notably,201
emphasized the contrast between the role and function of
regulatory administrators and those of judges in ordinary
adjudication. Crowell v. Benson202 was a watershed case
because of the Court’s embrace, albeit subject to
conditions,203 of administrative adjudication as a substitute
for courts.204 And yet the question was what methods of
201. See LANDIS, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, supra note 3; Felix Frankfurter,
The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614 (1927).
202. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). See generally VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION, supra
note 3, at 26 (“Hughes’s synthesis was enormously influential”); Mark Tushnet,
The Story of Crowell: Grounding the Administrative State, in FEDERAL COURTS
STORIES 359–88 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010); Richard H. Fallon
Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 915 (1988).
203. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 22. The principal condition being that so-called
jurisdictional facts should be considered de novo by the courts.
204. Id.; see also St. Joseph Stockyards v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936);
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920); Reuel E.
Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal
Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 401–04 (2007); Rubin, Due Process,
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decisionmaking and what formalities of procedure would be
required in this new modality of adjudication. On this,
Crowell and its immediate progeny took no position.205
The commitment to—and, indeed, the insistence on—
some procedural ingenuity in the administrative process was
relatively quick in coming. A classic early administrative law
case, SEC v. Chenery Corp.,206 provides some illumination.
There the Court endeavored to navigate between the
requirements of fair procedure to be imposed on these young
agencies and the distinctiveness of administrative agency
processes.207 In Chenery II, the Court approved the agency’s
discretion to use adjudication as a means of developing new
policies under the statute (albeit urging them to use
rulemaking for that purpose, given some advantages with
that technique).208 Having anointed adjudication—and, to be
more precise, adjudication of facts both adjudicative and
legislative facts in the proceedings before the Commission,
not the development of law as in ordinary common law where
the lawmaking happens in the appellate process—the Court
noted the deference that agencies deserved in such settings:
“The Commission’s conclusion . . . is the product of
administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities
of the problem, realization of the statutory policies, and
responsible treatment of the uncontested facts.”209 In short,

supra note 171, at 1049 (“[T]he Court had accepted the notion that an
administrative agency, when subjected to procedural standards, could function
as fairly as a judicial decisionmaker.”).
205. See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co., 298 U.S. at 38.
206. 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (Chenery II). The first decision was SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (Chenery I).
207. Professor Kevin Stack suggests a broader reading of Chenery II. He sees
the Court as insisting upon reasoned decisionmaking as necessary to meet the
conditions for a suitable delegation under the Court’s nondelegation doctrine. See
Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952
(2007). But see VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION, supra note 3, at 199 (taking issue
with this interpretation).
208. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 203.
209. Id. at 208.
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“[i]t is the type of judgment which administrative agencies
are best equipped to make and which justifies the use of the
administrative process.”210
Chenery II represents an evolution in thinking from
Morgan v. United States,211 where the Court insisted on
various procedural requirements in what they called this
“quasi-judicial proceeding.”212 Whatever uncertain context
was given to “quasi-judicial” in this pre-APA decision, was
clarified first by the APA, enacted a decade later, and next
by the Chenery decisions and other cases decided under
administrative law principles in the decades after the New
Deal and the APA. What become increasingly clear as the
practice of administrative adjudication evolved, is that the
contours and expectations of these adjudicatory
proceedings—the lion’s share of which were, again, informal
under the APA’s formulation—were to be understood in light
of Congressional delegation (“realization of the statutory
policies”) and “administrative experience.”213
The historical framing does not settle the issue, however.
Perhaps we have moved along from Chenery II’s strong
deference approach to a model of agency procedure that
aligns better with goals of adjudicatory fairness, goals which
transcend any particular setting or institution. Recalling the
framing of the fairness issue in Morgan214 we might believe
that the novelty and character of administrative
adjudication should contemplate nonetheless a core of
impartiality.
Chenery II got the balance right in cordoning off most

210. Id.
211. 304 U.S. 1 (1938) (Morgan II); see also United States. v. Morgan, 313 U.S.
409 (1941) (Morgan IV); United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939) (Morgan
III); Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936) (Morgan I).
212. Morgan II, 304 U.S. at 22.
213. See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 210.
214. As well as the influential suggestion of Judge Friendly. See Friendly,
Hearing, supra note 16.
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administrative hearings from bias prohibitions and other
formalities characteristic of ordinary trials. By “balance,” I
mean the scheme of administrative adjudication practiced by
most agencies in most instances that developed in tension,
and not in clear alignment, with classic notions of
adjudicatory fairness. What is in tension with this balance
are the vicissitudes of contemporary bias law which mainly
presuppose that judicial intervention can and should restore
the administrative adjudicatory process to the baseline of
adjudicatory fairness. While neither Crowell nor Chenery II
had to opine, must less decide about, the pansophy of this
baseline, the Court’s analysis of the emerging schema of the
federal administrative process reinforced the will and
strategy of the framers of these innovations that the New
Deal agency should be unique in structure and objective.
Fairness was not abandoned, but was adapted to meet new
needs.215
In contemporary regulatory administration, an
especially important venue for administrative adjudication
is in the administration of government benefits, this
including social security and veteran’s benefits, and also
resolving disputes in the immigration context. The scope of
these functions are vast, of course, and it has proved difficult
to establish the right balance of mechanisms to implement a
just system of benefits administration with the enormous
costs borne to the system by retail adjudication of
disputes.216 This is not the place to investigate in any serious
215. Two agencies who famously used adjudication to develop administrative
policy were the FTC and the NLRB. They each developed creative tools and
techniques to assure that interested groups had opportunities to contribute their
views and that the process was fair and rational. And yet, importantly, the
contents of what fairness and rationality meant in these settings were tied
importantly to the goals and objectives of these complex statutes.
216. See JONAH GELBACH & DAVID MARCUS, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., A STUDY
SOCIAL SECURITY LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (Final Report, 2016),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016.07.28%20 Report%20%
20A%20Study%20of%20Social%20Security%20Litigation%20in%20the%20Fede
ral%20Courts.pdf; David Hausman, The Failure of Immigration Appeals, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. 1177 (2016); Kathleen G. Noonan et al., Legal Accountability in the
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detail the large questions of administrative justice and
bureaucratic goal-setting. However, it bears emphasis that
Congress has crafted systems, and agencies have put
procedural systems in place, consistent with their discretion
to do so, to deploy expertise in order to get at more accurate
and more efficient decisions. We saw in Campbell one
mechanism for doing so, that is, the replacement of ad hoc
judgment with an objective matrix.217 There the Court
respected the decision by agencies to replace adjudicatory
procedures with a process more “legislative in character,”218
a choice that has the effect, if not the purpose, of reducing
the requirement of administrator partiality. This scheme at
issue there was not idiosyncratic, but illustrates the
direction in which agencies have been moving in the last half
century, as caseloads have grown and the capacity for
individualized justice is stretched.
Jerry Mashaw appreciated this tension three-and-half
decades ago in his important study of social security
implementation.219 Despite the insistence on administrator
impartiality in the social security context, the adjudicator, as
he explained, ought not be an automaton. Indeed, he noted
the ways in which the hearing process, a process in which
“the decisionmaker must be neutral,”220 is in tension with the
management supervision model. Hearings, and presumably
the strict requirement of neutrality, “fits uneasily into the

Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 L. & SOC.
INQ. 523 (2009); Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007). A classic exegesis of the
complex issues raised in the administration of the welfare system is William H.
Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198
(1983).
217. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983); supra text accompanying
notes 195–97.
218. Campbell, 461 U.S. at 467–68.
219. See MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 57, at 29 (noting the
tension between the moral judgment and bureaucratic rationality models of
administrative decisionmaking).
220. Id. at 29.
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bureaucratic scheme.”221 More recently, Daniel Ho and his
colleagues have investigated with great technical and legal
aptitude the chaotic veterans’ administration system.222
Many of the conclusions point toward the development of a
model and practice of adjudication that is tailored more
effectively to the unique circumstances of this complex
process.223 Interestingly, some focus on the use of predictive
analytics and artificial intelligence accompanies their
analysis. And if the efforts underway by the Administrative
Conference
of
the
United
States,224 algorithmic
decisionmaking will become a much more prominent part of
administrative adjudication.225 All of this is to say that the
character of adjudication in the administrative context is
ever evolving; and as it evolves, it becomes increasingly
quaint to talk in broad terms such as “adjudicatory fairness.”
Certainly, fairness as a concept must evolve in important
ways to keep pace with changes in the structure and
mechanisms of administrative justice.226
3. Adjudication’s Character
The focus on modern regulatory administration and its
221. Id. at 43; see also EDLEY, supra note 1, at 13–26 (1990) (describing
adjudicatory fairness as one part of the essential trichotomy of regulatory
administration).
222. See Daniel Ho et al., Quality Review of Mass Adjudication: A Randomized
Natural Experiment at the Board of Veterans Appeals, 2003-16, 35 J. L. Econ. &
Org. 239 (2019).
223. See id. at 267–84.
224. Artificial Intelligence in Federal Agencies , ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S.,
https://www.acus.gov/research-projects/artificial-intelligence-federal-agencies;
see also Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative
Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147 (2017).
225. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Algorithms, Correcting Biases, SSRN
(Dec. 12, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3300171 (preliminary draft for Social
Research).
226. Chris Edley makes the point that one of the failings in the trichotomy of
politics, science, and adjudicatory fairness as it developed new force in the era of
the Great Society and the emergence of new social regulation is the difficulty of
reconciling key governance goals when these modes of decisionmaking come into
conflict. See EDLEY, supra note 1, at 72–95, 187–90.
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exigencies can, without more, blind us to the goals we cherish
in individualized decisionmaking—matters involving, as the
D.C. Circuit said in its Sangamon Valley decision,
“conflicting private claims to a valuable privilege”227—and
for which adjudicatory fairness provides an appealing
summary. Is the issue zero sum, in that we purchase great
efficiencies in the administration of complex regulatory
schemes at the price of justice and individual rights?228
Again with the caveat that a comprehensive analysis of
administrative adjudication and adjudicatory fairness is
beyond the scope of this paper, there are good reasons to
believe that the answer to this question is “no.” We can
understand adjudication as aiming toward certain social
goals while maintaining that administrative adjudication
has distinct objectives. To explore this, we look back to Lon
Fuller and The Forms and Limits of Adjudication.229
Adjudication, as Fuller describes, is but one form of social
ordering. It entails a mode of participation by the affected
party which includes presentation of proofs and reasoned
arguments. The “essence of adjudication” lies “in the office of
the judge.” 230 The judge is expected to be impartial, this as a
component of the obligation to hear proofs and reasoned
227. Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224
(D.C. Cir. 1959).
228. A robust “yes” is the answer given by prominent legal scholars, Philip
Hamburger and Richard Epstein. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, THE DUBIOUS MORALITY
OF MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2020); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW UNLAWFUL? (2015). This view accompanies objections by scholars focused on
American constitutionalism and the separation of powers. On the general issue
of delegation of power and the status of the administrative state, I share with
Professor Vermeule the view that these extreme views are “a form of quasi belief
or cognitive consumption for entertainment — like believing in UFOs or watching
dystopian movies.” Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe,
and Kagan on the Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 n.3 (2017).
However, we could embrace bureaucratic power while also insisting that its
exercise meet standards of procedural fairness that resemble the trial process.
229. Fuller, supra note 19. For this discussion of Fuller and administrative
adjudication, I am grateful for discussions with Professor Charles Fried of the
Harvard Law School.
230. Id. at 365. This is by contrast to contracting and elections.
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arguments.231 After all, it is not just the hearing, but the
decision that is based upon that hearing. To this point, we
can see Fuller’s conception of adjudication’s requisites,
mapping on exactly to the circumstance of adjudication in the
administrative setting. Is not the imperative of the
administrative law judge to hear proof and reasoned
arguments without bias or prejudice?
Not so for Professor Fuller. He famously observes that
decisionmaking settings in which polycentric problems are at
issue are ill-suited to the standard forms of adjudication.232
We do not have to imagine that Fuller might have had in
mind administrative decisionmaking here, for he says so
explicitly, in a passage in which he replies to Hayek’s critique
of common-law adjudication. Fuller says
A good many of our regulatory agencies were initiated in the hope
that as knowledge was gained case by case a body of principle would
emerge that would be understandable by all concerned and that
would bring their adjudicative decisions within the rule of law. In
some cases, this hope has been at least partially vindicated; in
others it has been almost completely disappointed . . . . I suggest
that the cause may lie in a desire to escape the frustration of trying
to act as a judge in a situation affording no standard of decision.233

Still, Fuller equivocates on the fundamental matter of
whether the particular structure of adjudication in the
administrative process requires, as a component of the rule
of law, that the decision be based upon the proof and
reasoned arguments, rather than by other considerations.
On the one hand, there is this: “[I]f the grounds for the
decision fall completely outside the framework of the
argument, making all that was discussed or proved at the
hearing irrelevant—then the adjudicative process has

231. See id. at 368.
232. See id. at 371.
233. Id. at 374–75.
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become a sham . . . .”234 This is a succinct statement of not
only strands of bias doctrine, but also familiar
administrative law on the meaning of on-the-record
proceedings. But he also says this, specifically in the context
of administrative agency decisionmaking:
Where the standards of decision are vague and fluctuating, when
the time comes for final disposition of the case it may be apparent
that most of what was argued and proved at the public hearing has
become irrelevant . . . . In many cases, this conduct should be
characterized as inept, rather than wicked.235

For Professor Fuller, the requirement of impartiality
really depends upon the source of the law and availability of
legal rules which make adjudication a matter of determining
rights and duties, rather than something else. In essence, if
the adjudicatory setting does not call for a process in which
individual rights are at issue and therefore these individuals
whose rights are in jeopardy are entitled to present proof and
make their case through reasoned argument, then there is
not the correlative obligation on the decisionmaker to hear
the case without prejudice, that is, without drawing upon
insights and evidence outside the context of the
administrative process. Note that Fuller stops short of
blessing such an administrative choice, seeing the risks that
this process will be potentially “inept.” But there is
nonetheless daylight between a balanced assessment of the
efficacy of the process and a judgment that implicates core
notions of adjudicatory fairness and a way that implicates
procedural due process.236
Although Fuller did not reflect on this question in his
essay,237 the question arises of who gets to decide on the
234. Id. at 388.
235. Id. at 389.
236. To be clear, Fuller does not opine on the matter of whether due process
factors into evaluations of adjudication. So, we can only speculate about whether
and to what extent he would have viewed partiality in administrative
adjudication as raising due process concerns and considerations.
237. Some of the larger issues which impact thinking about regulatory

2021]

WHITHER THE NEUTRAL AGENCY?

439

assessment of whether rights are implicated and,
correlatively, what kind of process meets standards of
adjudicatory fairness. However, the more focused, and
ultimately more useful, way to think about this is to come
back to a key point about administrative regulation more
generally and that is that the metes and bounds of regulation
and the regulatory process are set by statute. Just as
Congress is responsible for establishing the scope of
delegation by statute, it, too, sets out conditions and details
for the processes by which regulatory policy is made. This
will include judgments about how best to balance
considerations of decisionmaking objectivity with subjective
elements that are deemed acceptable as part of the decisional
criteria. Viewing adjudicatory fairness in the administrative
context as a principle akin to the brooding omnipresence in
the sky is unhelpful; rather, fairness as defined by law
beyond the organic statute, whether by the Constitutional or
administrative law, will have a fairly bounded role for, after
all, there are not easily discernible standards of fair process,
as Fuller reminds us, that can be decoupled from judgments
about the functions of adjudication as a form of social
ordering and of policy implementation.238
administration and administrative law come closer to the surface in LON L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). This is the subject of a fascinating recent
article by Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule. See Sunstein & Vermeule, Morality
of Administrative Law, supra note 52. In it, they look to Fuller and his exegesis
on THE MORALITY OF LAW as a measure of what they call the “morality of
administrative law.” They evaluate a number of classic and modern
administrative law doctrines through the lens of what they call the Fullerian
virtues, these including transparency, establishment of rules to limit discretion,
stability, and alignment between rules on the books and law in action, and so
forth. See id. How does administrative law measure up to these ideals?
Imperfectly, they suggest, and in some cases not at all. As to impartiality in
particular, they suggest that a certain type of external influence, “telephone
justice,” is inconsistent with Fuller’s criticism of ad hoc decisionmaking. Yet, as
they go on to argue, Fuller well understood that adjudication in its prescriptively
pure form was likely ill-suited to most decisions in the administrative context,
and certainly decisionmaking involving polycentric problems. See id. at 1961.
This is consistent with how I read Fuller’s essay.
238. I do not undertake here to canvas other important theories of adjudication
or even to suggest that Fuller’s perspective here is or ought to be talismanic.
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4. Adjudicatory Fairness as Administrative Agency
Goal-Setting
The last two sections focused on disentangling
administrative adjudication from the classic depiction of
adjudicatory fairness which undergirds bias law. But it
would be the wrong lesson to draw from this discussion that
there are no principled limits on agency adjudication, and
therefore bias law is built on a fundamental error. On the
contrary, there are limits; they are critical to the process, and
we can understand how best to restrict and regulate the
worst forms of administrative partiality and selfishness by
focusing in earnest on the best reasons for these limits.
We set the terms of administrative adjudication,
including the functions of both fact-finding and legal
interpretation, by resort to the structure of the legislature’s
delegation of power and, too, to the objectives of sound
administrative decisionmaking not exhausted by the statute
and its guidelines. This is a solid lesson for administrative
law generally, but I will not dwell on that general point here.
So far as bias law is concerned, I make the narrow point that
insofar as adjudicatory fairness stands as a polestar for the
There are other views to be sure, and a deeper jurisprudential analysis is both
above my pay grade and beyond the scope of this Article. That said, I do want to
pause to note an interesting analysis by a leading political theorist. See generally
Gerald J. Postema, The Principle of Utility and the Law of Procedure: Bentham’s
Theory of Adjudication, 11 GA. L. REV. 1393, 1401–02 (1977). The focus on
Bentham is not random, for, as Postema says, Bentham’s theory of adjudication
represents the only sustained attempt in the English language (except for recent
work done by Professor Fuller’) at a philosophical account of the law of
procedure.” Id. at 1393. Postema notes that, for Bentham, the fundamental
objective of procedural law (what he famously labels “adjective” law) is to fulfill
the objectives of substantive law, law which aims toward maximizing social
utility. “Of the adjective branch of law,” Bentham writes, “the only defensible
object, or say end in view, is the maximization of the execution and effect given
to the substantive branch of the law.” Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Judicial
Procedure, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 6 (John Bowring ed., 18381843). The relevance to our discussion here is that, in Bentham’s account, there
is precious little role for an independent norm or principle of adjudicatory
fairness. As Postema summarizes Bentham’s view: “The notion of justice . . . is
multifarious and indeterminate, and, [Bentham] seems to imply, offers us no
rational basis for evaluating systems of adjudication.” Postema, supra, at 1409.
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responsibility of agency officials, as it does, it is important to
see that the contents of this fairness principle are best
formed by scrupulous attention to the delegation of power
and, further, the imperative of ensuring that the agency is
facilitating the legislature’s aims in its policymaking,
interpretive, and fact-finding roles.
We come back, as we always do in matters of regulatory
administration, to the puzzle of discretion.239 The role of
administrative procedures in cabining and channeling
discretion is well-known and reasonably well-understood.
The academic and doctrinal battles rightly circle around the
“how” rather than the “why.” In his important Holmes
Lectures at Harvard Law School, published in 1962 as the
monograph, Federal Administrative Agencies,240 Judge
Henry Friendly explained the value of established
administrative procedures in order to provide more definitive
guidance to agencies in setting regulatory policy through
adjudication. “Lack of definite standards,” Friendly wrote,
“creates a void into which attempts to influence are bound to
rush; legal vacuums are quite like physical ones in that
respect.”241 Shrewdly, he saw the value of adjudicative
standards as including the strengthening of the agencies’
ability to resist attempts from outside (“from businessmen,
legislators, and the executive branch”) to influence agency
decisions.242 “[A] crystallization of standards is . . . necessary
to the maintenance of the independence which the agencies
so highly prize.”243 In Friendly’s account, insistence upon

239. A puzzle that has worried everyone who has ever thought about public
administration and administrative law, perhaps no one more than A.V. Dicey.
See A.V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION et seq. (9th ed. 1939); see also
Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487
(1982) [hereinafter Shapiro, Next Stage].
240. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE
NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS (1962).
241. Id. at 22.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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adjudicatory standards serves aims that are tied to not some
objective of fairness in a due process sense, but are in the
service of larger social goals, this stemming from the purpose
of, and the reasons for, Congressional delegation of power to
agencies.
Judge Friendly’s short description of the value of
standards, in a more comprehensive analysis of federal
administrative agencies circa early 1960’s, raises a more
general point worth emphasizing here as we circle back to
the main theme of this section. The context in which the
issue of adjudicatory fairness and impartiality arises, both
as a matter of fundamental principle and in application of
bias doctrines, is the establishment of guidelines and
objectives in the delegation of power to agencies. In other
words, it should be principally to the goals set out by
Congress, augmented by judgments (to whom we rightly
defer) of agencies themselves, to which we should look in
measuring the metes and bounds of adjudicatory fairness.
What fairness requires in, say, the context of immigration
proceedings and welfare benefits may well be different than
what it requires in adjudications involving unfair trade or
labor practices. To be sure, this may not reflect the relative
importance of the policy to disputants or to society as a
whole. Congress, happily, needs not to define when they
establish a regulatory program. Rather, the important
judgment made by Congress and the agencies is how to
balance “moral judgment” with “bureaucratic rationality,”244
how to weigh, as the Court in Mathews counseled, the
benefits of more extravagant procedures with the costs of
those procedures.245 This weighing of interests has become
conventional, which is not to say without controversy, in the
matter of procedural due process post-Mathews and, as well,
in post-Vermont Yankee assessments of what processes are
required in the administrative context under the APA and

244. See MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 57.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 184–218 (discussing Mathews).
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administrative common law.
Even a principle of such sacredness and salience as
impartiality and the necessity of an impartial decisionmaker
should be measured against the standard of what Congress
has decided in establishing the regulatory program, what the
agency has determined makes sense from a pragmatic
perspective, and, more generally, what are the larger goals
of regulatory administration. This is not to say that bias
doctrine should be extirpated root and branch, leaving only
a “trust Congress and the agencies” standard in its place. As
the very first two sentences of this paper indicated, our
dilemma is how best to balance our faith and trust in
administration with our concern that agencies and their
officials will abuse this trust. The concerns raised here with
respect to due process and the inchoate notion of
adjudicatory fairness do not make this problem go away.
Fairness is a concept constructed around views of the
administrative state more generally. However, these views
are seldom excavated and explored in the bias cases. While
this is hard to suss out in the context of particular dispute in
which partiality (real and perceived) is the issue before the
court, we would do well to see the underlying values and
assumptions
undergirding
judgments
about
the
trustworthiness of one or another decision. In considering,
for example, the issues raised in the FTC cases of the mid1960’s,246 there is a fundamental normative question of
whether the agency chair was serving or disserving the cause
of effective, reasonable regulation by being transparent with
his views about the conduct of the industry. The real
question was not whether he was going to become openminded about this issue in the face of evidence and proof in
the proceeding involving the cement industry; rather, it was
whether he should either keep his mouth shut or, if he could
not or would not manage that, whether he should remove
himself from the proceeding. We cannot answer that
246. See supra text accompanying notes 76–79.
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question without resort to the underlying question of what
fairness means in a proceeding in which an expert agency
official came to the process informed by precisely the set of
issues that warranted his designation as “expert.”
We saw in our discussion of Campbell above,247 the
eagerness of the Court to limit the agency process to a
mechanical set of criteria where Congress had so decried. In
this circumstance, the court would certainly rule out in an
adjudication any external influences such as pecuniary
advantage and political pressure, for this would undermine
the very purpose of this matrix’s use to limit discretion.
However, we would not say that the hearing examiner comes
to the issue of disability adjudication with an open mind,
leaving it to the disputants to present proof and legal
argument for their position. Rather, we would say that the
process mandates what amounts to a closed mind by virtue
of the use of a mechanical standard. The closed mind serves
the end of limiting administrator discretion. This meets the
concerns of those who fret about unbounded discretion in
adjudication; it meets directly the concern Judge Friendly
articulated about the establishment of adjudicatory
standards; and it is congruent with Congressional will, an
essential requisite of administrative power. But is it fair?
Who is to say? Rather, it is to the structure and purpose of
the regulatory program and the Congressionally defined
function of the administrative agency that we would look to
assess whether the agency administrator is acting not only
properly as a matter of statutory law, but also consistent
with our objectives of due process.248
247. See supra text accompanying notes 195–97.
248. A sensible approach to these questions is the First Circuit in Pangburn v.
Civil Aeronautics Board, 311 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962). In that case, the CAB had
proceeded from its decision in a case involving the reasons for an airline crash
(pilot error) to a determination about the pilot’s flying license. The court decided
this case on the narrow, and perhaps somewhat implausible grounds, that there
was no evidence to support the view that the agency had made up its mind. More
central to the matter is the fact that Congress had accorded the CAB the role and
responsibility to make both determinations. Further, it left it to the agency to
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We have another principal issue to discuss in connection
with bias doctrine, one that is typically (and I believe
usefully) juxtaposed with the matter of fairness, and that is
the objective of administrative rationality. Even if we are
convinced by reasons for skepticism about adjudicatory
fairness as a source of guidance for modern bias law, we
might fall back on a very different set of considerations, these
dealing with rationality. We turn to that now.
B. Administrative Rationality
Beyond fairness lies another conspicuous goal of the
regulatory process and that is administrative rationality.
Agency decisions are expected to be the outcomes of an
informed process that demands careful synthesis of facts and
evidence, fidelity to legal standards, and the manifestation
of expert (and even technocratic) judgment. We expect that
it will look different in style and structure than other
modalities of decisionmaking, be it statute-making, ordinary
adjudication, or direct democracy. After all, what is the case
for meaningful delegation to this “headless fourth branch” of
government if not for the capacity of administrative agencies
to construct and implement policy in a distinct, and
especially rational, way? At a general level, administrative
rationality becomes a quality that justifies delegation. At a
more practical level, it becomes a basis, a label for a set of
criteria, by which we can set rules and requirements for
administrative decisionmaking and standards for conducting
ex post review of agency decisions under the APA and other
relevant statutes.

decide how to conduct a hearing in that second process, including whether and to
what extent to hear new evidence. Having given the pilot an opportunity to be
heard and to present evidence that could suggest, if not that the CAB was wrong
in reaching its judgment about the airline crash, the CAB was within its
discretion to reach a judgment on the license issue. This was consistent with
Congress’s judgment about how this scheme should be structured and with the
agency’s choice about which procedures were best suited to the proceeding.
Asking the abstract question of whether the proceeding was fair seems quite
unilluminating.
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Lest we view the command of rationality in
administrative decisionmaking to have a magical quality,
that can tether both scope of review and bias doctrine to a
clear descriptive and normative guidepost, we should see
that bureaucratic rationality is a social construct. It cannot
be defined objectively, as Gerald Frug reminds us in his
classic article, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American
Law.249 “Theorists have not been able to distinguish and
render compatible the subjective and objective aspects of
organizational life because no line between subjectivity and
objectivity can ever be drawn.”250 Nor can it remain
inscrutable. It needs to be defined at some accessible level so
we can operationalize the idea for the purposes of rules of
agency conduct and scope of review.
1. Models of Rationality in Regulatory Administration
In considering the project of promoting rationality in
regulatory administration, we can see three themes—
overlapping, to be sure, but distinct in ways that matter to
our consideration of bias in regulatory administration.
First, rationality emerges as an essential quality of
agency expertise.251 This conception of administrative
governance, familiar to Max Weber252 and Frederick

249. See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 1276 (1984).
250. Frug says “organizational life” rather than bureaucracy, but it is
fundamentally the latter that draws his focus. The “project of bureaucratic
legitimation is a failure.” Id. at 1287. And its failings stem the hopeless effort to
draw and cement the subjective/objective distinction. However, the case for the
modern bureaucracy and its flourishing through networks and webs of law and
democracy can be sustained—and, indeed, Frug’s summa on law and bureaucracy
is an effort “to make the creation of such new forms of organization possible.” Id.
at 1296.
251. See id. at 1318–34 (describing the “expertise model”). See generally BOB
HASTINGS & RENATE E. MEYER, STARTING POINTS: INTELLECTUAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATION THEORY (2018) (situating
expertise theories in larger context of sociology of organizations).
252. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (1922).
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Winslow Taylor,253 and sourced in the Progressive Era model
of agency functioning, is captured in the memorable line from
New York Mayor Fiorella LaGuardia: “There is no
Democratic or Republican way of cleaning the streets.”254
Agencies, in this account, exercise power and gain legitimacy
from a font of expertise.255 Administrators are selected for
their ability to mobilize and execute policy from this vantage
point; and, indeed, the case for delegation rests in some part
on the capacity and diligence of administrative agencies to
mobilize and deploy this expertise in their exercise of power,
to, as Ernst Freund put it, “evolve principle out of constantly
recurrent action.”256
In this conception, we aspire to have these
administrators function without political considerations
(from their own views or from external political influence).257
In resisting politics, bureaucracies can more efficaciously use
science and scientific methods; and, hearkening back to the
political theory of the Framing period, agencies can keep at
bay some of the more noxious elements of democracy,
including factions, which troubled Madison and other

253. See FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
(1911). See generally PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION (1957).
254. The exact source of the quotation, frequently cited, is elusive. It is
mentioned in CHARLES GARRETT, THE LA GUARDIA YEARS: MACHINE AND REFORM
POLITICS IN NEW YORK CITY (1961).
255. See LANDIS, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, supra note 3, at 23; see also
HORWITZ, supra note 10, at 216 (“But what gave unelected administrators
legitimacy to engage in regulatory tasks? Expertise, Landis confidently declared
. . . . The Administrative Process is a joyous celebration of the virtues of
‘expertness’ in justifying the growth of the administrative state.”).
256. Ernst Freund, The Substitution of Rule for Discretion in Public Law, 9
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 666, 671–72 (1915) (quoted in ERNST, supra note 3, at 15).
257. See, e.g., FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
UNITED STATES (1905) (“[T]he discharge of [the agency’s] functions . . .
should be uninfluenced by political considerations . . . . The more politics gets into
[administration] the less effective and less impartial will the work be.”); see also
HORWITZ, supra note 10, at 222–25 (describing “the scientific tradition”
underlying New Deal bureaucracy); Pierce, Political Control, supra note 103, at
489.
OF THE
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architects of our constitutional order.258
This expertise model of instrumental rationality has
important implications for the design of administrative
procedure and administrative law. The APA elaborates
various procedures for formal rulemaking and adjudication
that are designed to promote expert decisionmaking, this
consistent with encomia to expertise common in New Deal
era discussions of the administrative state. And, perhaps
more meaningfully, given the steady growth of notice-andcomment rulemaking in the last half century, hard look
review post-State Farm has aspired to promote instrumental
rationality and well-reasoned decisionmaking.259 “In
regulatory administration, the experts rule” would seem to
be a cogent summary of the courts’ approach in the leading
hard look cases of the last half century.260
In this expertise model of administrative rationality, we
want agencies to deploy expertise, but in a fashion that
meets the imperatives of an administrative process which
has procedures to guide judgment and channel
administrative discretion. Expertise yes, but not in a form
unmediated and unregulated.261 Administrative law comes
into the picture of regulatory administration, albeit with an
eye toward maintaining the ability of agencies to act as
experts and to keep the enterprise largely pure from brute
politics or other improper subjective influences. We expect
agencies to use decisionmaking processes to collect evidence
from those with a stake and interest in the process. In onthe-record hearings, this process unavoidably resembles a
trial process, and the expertise expected from the agency is
focused on the implementation of the hearing process and on
258. See DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST (1984).
259. See generally Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98
HARV. L. REV. 505 (1985).
260. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law Revisited, 31 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 782 (2015).
261. See HORWITZ, supra note 10, at 233–35 (describing the post-New Deal reemergence of proceduralism).
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how the court evaluates the record in reaching a final
judgment. In the more common scenario of informal
rulemaking and adjudication, administrative rationality
through expert judgment comes from the more holistic
examination of the considerations raised in the matter, the
comments adduced through the rulemaking process, and the
reasons revealed in the “concise general statement of basis
and purpose.”
Tellingly, Richard Stewart observed in the midst of the
hard look review era that administrative law was moving in
the direction of an interest-representation model.262 In that,
some modicum of black-box type expertise was sublimated to
a more transparent process in which agencies were tasked
with considering and evaluating views and evidence
presented by interested persons.263 The emergence of this
interest representation model reflects a meaningful, if tacit,
shift from the Progressive era-fashion of expert
decisionmaking to a model that is more focused on
deliberation and dialogue. A number of influential
262. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 1680.
263. In an extremely valuable commentary on Lon Fuller’s exegesis on
adjudication, and published alongside Fuller’s article, Professor Mel Eisenberg
describes the accommodation to a more participatory process which would
navigate between the traditional model of adjudication and lawmaking which is
distinctive in both ideal and in operation. Melvin Eisenberg, Participation,
Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 410 (1978). “The consultative process,” as Eisenberg describes it,
is distinguished from adjudication by the fact that . . . the decision need
not proceed from or be congruent with the parties’ proofs and arguments.
Instead, the decisionmaker may base his decision solely on evidence he
has himself collected, on his own experience, on his institutional
preferences, and on rules neither adduced nor addressed by the parties.
Id. at 414 (emphasis added). Eisenberg distinguished this process from
adjudication, but we should emphasize that both of the informal forms of agency
decisionmaking, rulemaking and what is defined by the APA as adjudication (in
that it is a process for the developing of an administrative order), are consultative
in the way described here. He goes on to say that “[f]or the consultative process
to work effectively, it must be characterized by openmindedness on the part of
the decisionmaker . . . .” Id. at 417. At the same time, he urges judicial restraint
and appears to approve of the Court’s move, in Mathews and afterward, to tailor
the constitutional analysis to the nature and character of the proceeding.
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administrative law scholars, including Colin Diver,264
Christopher Edley,265 Lisa Bressman,266 and Martin
Shapiro267 have described this development. They see its
rudiments in a body of work by political theorists who
emphasize the value and virtues of dialogic reasoning,
perhaps beginning in earnest with Rawls,268 Habermas,269
and Rorty270 and continuing through scholars’ efforts
beginning in the 1970s and continuing to the present to
develop a deliberation-centered language for modern public
law.271 In assessing the terrain of administrative law in the
modern hard look era,272 the effort—reflecting a mix of both
doctrinal analysis and wishful thinking—was to impose
requirements of reasoned deliberation on agencies.273 The
objective was to establish a standard of administrative
rationality by which we could measure the efficacy and
normative appeal of administrative regulation and
procedure. Rationality, also instrumental to its core, is

264. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95
HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981).
265. See EDLEY, supra note 1.
266. See Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 147, at 1761–63;
Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 8.
267. See SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?, supra note 138, at 1–35;
Shapiro, Next Stage, supra note 239.
268. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971).
269. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1992); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1981) [hereinafter HABERMAS,
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION].
270. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
271. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980);
John Stick, Can Nihilism be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986); Frank I.
Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986);
Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive
Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617 (1985).
272. See, e.g., Garland, supra note 259, at 555.
273. See Diver, supra note 264; SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?, supra
note 138.

2021]

WHITHER THE NEUTRAL AGENCY?

451

defined as pluralist, inclusive, and democratic.274 It also
tilted hard toward expansive regulation, a point not lost on
commentators or advocates of more circumscribed regulation
and governmental action.275
The ambitions for administrative rationality expressed
in both the expertise and deliberation models could be seen
as competing with a model of administrative regulation as
mainly another species of politics, with the template of sound
regulatory decisionmaking coming largely from the playbook
of legislative and judicial procedure, only modified to take
account of some of the unique features of agencies and
regulation. More subtly, these models resist mightily the
idea that agencies should be acting mainly as instruments of
their Congressional and Presidential principals. Their views
compete with anti-political, if not necessarily antidemocratic, in their origins and tenor. They also compete
with what Stewart memorably called the “transmission belt”
approach to regulatory decisionmaking,276 the idea that
administrative agencies are by and large captured by outside
pressure groups and their actions could be seen as such.277
Rationality in both of these models becomes an explanation
for delegation and also a set of criteria) from which the
designers of regulatory institutions and also reviewing
courts can measure these infectious elements and rescue
agencies from their perils.278

274. See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 8.
275. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
276. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 1675, 1688.
277. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court 2015 Term: Foreword:
Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 33, 113–20 (2016).
278. Although the matter of “rescuing” is highly fraught. See, e.g., Einer R.
Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991). Some of the more intriguing contemporary suggestions
focus on institutional design as ameliorative steps. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow,
Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L.
REV. 15 (2010). Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence:
Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
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A third model of administrative rationality comes into
the picture here and thus builds on the emerging idea that
agencies have a responsibility to implement certain rights
claims on government action. The language of rights
modifies, although does not efface entirely, the notion that
administrative regulation reflects a new form of public
policy, one in which the government looks beyond obligation
and need (styled as rights) and to sound and sensible
assessments of what policies are advisable and what
tradeoffs are necessary to square society’s expectations and
demands with available public resources.279
The early threads of this notion of rationality are found
in writings of leading administrative law scholars such as
Richard Stewart and Cass Sunstein. They articulate a
theoretical case for regulatory rights in an influential article
whose title telegraphs the main point, Public Programs and
Private Rights.280 This theme is developed in some of
Sunstein’s later work, most notably in his book on the
unfulfilled legacy of Franklin Roosevelt’s declaration of the
Second Bill of Rights as a calling for a new regulatory
paradigm,281 one that can aspire to merge democracy with
rationality in order to implement a broader and brighter
future of administrative regulation.282 Rationality in this
framing occludes broadly discretionary policy judgments and
instead is measured by the success or failure of agencies in
safeguarding the rights of regulatory beneficiaries.283
1655 (2006).
279. See RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT, supra note 170.
280. Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982).
281. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S SECOND
REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2006).
282. For an important critique of this rights focus, nested in a general
examination of the administrative state and its legal and cultural underpinnings,
see RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT supra note 170; see also SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE
GUARDIANS?, supra note 138, at 117–24.
283. Other traces of this rights-focused rationality are found in the literature
on so-called positive rights, a literature which seldom appears prominent in
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Finally, we see an interestingly robust emphasis in
modern discussions among Progressives about a new public
rights paradigm, focusing especially on health care284 and
the environment (as in, for example, the Green New Deal).285
To be sure, the efforts to connect regulation and rights are
principally rhetorical. Yet we should not discount these
efforts for this reason. Rhetoric is what helped carry along
the Progressive era conceptions of expertise and technocratic
decisionmaking in earlier eras. Likewise, the deliberation
models of administrative governance are constructed by
snippets of judicial statements and in scholarship.286
These three models of administrative rationality have as
elements in common the commitment to agency
decisionmaking that looks past self-interest, political
influence and arbitrariness to sound governance with
appropriate use of facts and evidence and fidelity to the rule
of law. Where they differ is in the aims of rational
administration. Expertise models view agencies as capable
discussions of the modern regulatory process, largely because it is focused on
states, not the national government. See generally EMILY ZACKLIN, LOOKING FOR
RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S
POSITIVE RIGHTS (2013); RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT, supra note 170, at chapter 8
(discussing the move from human rights to moral demands).
284. See, e.g., Andrew Bradley, Positive rights, negative rights and health care,
36 J. MED. ETHICS 838 (2010).
285. On the Green New Deal, see Alexander C. Kaufman, What’s the “Green
New Deal”?, The surprising origins behind a progressive rallying cry, GRIST (June
30, 2018), https://grist.org/article/whats-the-green-new-deal-the-surprisingorigins-behind-a-progressive-rallying-cry/; Lisa Friedman & Trip Gabriel, A
Green New Deal Is Technologically Possible. Its Political Prospects Are Another
Question, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/
us/politics/green-new-deal.html. On the rise of “second New Deal” and “new social
rights” rhetoric, see Harold Meyerson, Elizabeth Warren Proposes a Second New
Deal, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Aug. 17, 2018), https://prospect.org/article/
elizabeth-warren-proposes-second-new-deal; A new frontier in economic and
social rights advocacy?, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
http://www.cesr.org/new-frontier-economic-and-social-rights-advocacy
(last
visited Jan. 30, 2021).
286. With some evidence that this literature has had a particularly interesting
impact on judicial decisionmaking in emerging constitutional democracies, such
as Israel and South Africa.
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of acting as “the ‘brain’ for [their] constituents” by exercising
relentless “rational and informed judgment.”287 Deliberation
models anticipate that agencies will facilitate dialogue and
will reach decisions according to an ideal of synoptic
rationality, enabled through dialogue and “communicative
action.”288 The new rights models will measure agency
capacity of efficacy based upon the commitments and success
of administrators to meet the moral demands constituencies
make on government in order to implement socially valuable
public policy. While all three models valorize rationality, at
both an abstract and a practical level, insofar as they aim in
different directions, they will portend different legal
strategies.
2. Administrative Rationality and Bias
The
prohibition
against
the
self-interested
decisionmaker is common to all of these models of
rationality. Indeed, this is true mainly by hypothesis.289 That
is, decisions motivated by the self-interest of an
administrator, using, as the paradigmatic case, the
administrator who is compromised by money will risk
steering the decision away from considerations which are
rational and can be warranted as such. To be sure, things get
a bit messier when we widen our view of self-interest to
include, say, the agency that interprets the scope of its

287. See Frug, supra note 249, at 1322–23.
288. See HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 269.
289. Professor Frug captures this “by hypothesis” point in an especially shrewd
way. He writes:
Neither taking the impersonality requirement seriously nor refusing to
take it seriously seems to work. The impersonality requirement seeks to
remove bias because bias is too personal and too subjective to be allowed
in bureaucratic decisionmaking. On the other hand, the requirement
permits expert discretion: expert judgment remains person (no two
experts are alike), but it is safely objectified. A restraint on expertise
would take objectivity too seriously because it would intrude on the
flexibility needed for creative decisionmaking.
Frug, supra note 249, at 1326.
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jurisdiction to accumulate more power. Here the question of
whether the agency’s institutional self-interest is or is not
consistent with expectations of rationality depend ultimately
upon the reasons why the agency is acting to expand its
power. We will consider this issue in Part III.C, in our
discussion of modern administrative law and interpretive
deference.
As to the ideal of the open-minded decisionmaker, the
connection between these bias doctrines and models of
agency rationality are complicated. With respect to expertise
models, we should want agency officials to draw upon their
wisdom and to cull information from whatever sources they
view as credible and important in order to reach their
judgments. To be sure, this could be squared with openmindedness—so, for example, we want an open-minded
scientist, if by that we mean a scientist who is led to her
decisions by the scientific method, rather than subjective,
unscientific criteria. In this regard, the prohibitions on
prejudice may be a prophylactic device to ensure that
external information which could compromise the purity of
the agency’s decisionmaker process should be kept out.
However, we could question whether we trust the court to
make that assessment in the situation in which one party or
an interested individual complains about the purity of the
process. Doesn’t the case for agency expertise come along
with a more parsimonious approach to evaluating agency
choices with respect to procedure? Instead of focusing
narrowly on the threat to instrumental rationality posed by
the agency official, we might focus on the institutional
incompetency of the courts in making an assessment of the
right amount of external information. The issue of judicial
capacity and institutional competence lays nearby here, as
always.
Within the structure of bias doctrine, we will still need
to interrogate the reasons undergirding that part of the
decisionmaker’s mind which appears to be fairly closed. And,
to further complicate matters, blackletter law tells us that
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that we should do so without probing the mind of the
administrator.290 Consider, in this regard, Ass’n of National
Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, discussed above.291
In a case like National Advertisers, administrative
rationality of the expertise flavor obliges the court to drill
down into why it is that Michael Pertschuk is so confident in
his view about the impact of advertising on children. Should
the court be focused on what motivates the agency chair in
this inquiry or should it undertake its own separate
assessment of whether a reasonable person would be
persuadable by facts that push in the other direction? The
question of how a decisionmaker came to his or her priors is
at issue in every case in which the claim of prejudice is
raised. We could, as the courts have, locate our rationale for
this judicial examination in a descriptive and normative
theory of the administrative process.292 But it remains
opaque about how a particular model of expertise as
rationality would help shape this inquiry.293
290. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, the Court held that the
agency decisionmaker did not explain sufficiently the rationale for the decision
reached, that is, the granting of a permit to build a road through Overton Park.
The Court rejected the argument that the dearth of prolix legal standards for
defining the scope of administrative discretion left the reviewing courts with no
law to apply and therefore this was a decision “committed to agency by law” under
section 706 of the APA. 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). Yet, in reviewing the agency
decision, the Court reiterated the injunction from the Morgan Cases that it would
be inappropriate to probe the mental processes of the agency. Id. at 420; see
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 424 (1941). The Court insisted that the
lower courts could nonetheless evaluate sufficiently the agency’s decision. Id.
“The bare record,” warned the Court, “may not disclose the factors considered or
the [agency’s] construction of the evidence,” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc., 401 U.S. at 420, and so the reviewing court may need to “examin[e] the
decisionmakers” in order to satisfy it that is not “bad faith or improper behavior.”
Id. at 420.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 89–94.
292. Frug remains dubious that we can do so, see Frug, supra note 249, at 1327
n.157 (noting that both the majority and the dissent, in arguing about the
“unalterably closed mind” standard are just restating the issue), and I agree.
293. The Cement Institute case is a good illustration of this conundrum. See
FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948). There the FTC had issued a
detailed report to Congress in which it described many ways in which the cement

2021]

WHITHER THE NEUTRAL AGENCY?

457

What of the model of rationality as deliberation? Here we
may find a more plausible connection between the traditional
approach in the caselaw to prejudice and the ambition of
rationality. Deliberation and dialogue supposes that the
agency will engage with multiple stakeholders, and through
a process that is broadly pluralistic. Such a process requires
the administrative agency decisionmaker to be open-minded,
by that meaning open to persuasion and committed to
engagement and dialogue. Such deliberation is important not
only insofar as it may lead the agency to change her mind,
but also because it will yield agency results, in both
rulemaking and adjudication, which can be fruitfully
measured by courts under the standards of reasonableness
embedded in State Farm/hard look review.294 One hopes, too,
that it will yield decisions which are socially acceptable and
thus reinforce the value of regulatory administration as a
means of exercising public power that is democratic.
Administrative rationality as a construct that reveals
the focus by agencies on meeting moral demands and on
safeguarding regulatory rights is not necessarily congruent
nor in tension with doctrines that limit bias either for selfindustry had used a so-called multiple basing point system to fix prices. This
description emerged from a comprehensive investigation of the industry. The
defendant Cement Institute claimed that this investigation and the
accompanying report suggested that the agency had an irrevocably closed mind
on the key issues in the adjudication. The Court rejected that argument, noting
that the agency was entitled to a “presumption of objectivity” and disagreeing
with the Cement Institute that the record revealed that the “minds of [the FTC’s]
members were irrevocably closed on the subject of respondent’s basing point
practices.” Id. at 701. On the presumption of regularity, see The Presumption of
Regularity in Judicial Review of the Executive Branch, supra note 72, at 2432
(describing origins and functions of this presumption and tying to general themes
in administrative law). This case reveals a conscientious agency chair (at least
this is the assumption of the narrative) under the klieg lights of the Senate, being
interrogated by a senator determined to push a particular outcome. We need not
take a position on whether it is Kefauver or Dixon who has the better of the
argument to worry that this attempt at influence is borne of political
considerations. And bias doctrine of this sort is a means by which such
disruptions to a scientific approach to regulatory decisionmaking are abated.
294. But see SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?, supra note 138, at 166–
67.
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interest or for prejudice. This model of rationality looks more
at the outcomes of the decisionmaking process than the
procedural inputs. It should be agnostic as to whether the
realization of these rights emerge from adjudication or
rulemaking. True, at some level this conception of rationality
looks to democratic accountability and the protection of the
social fabric—rationality being instrumental in this sense—
and therefore is pluralistic in a sense similar to the
deliberation model described above. However, the focus
remains on the measure of agency success in implementing
public policy which meets constituents’ demands for certain
public policy entitlements, be they universal health care,
consumer protection, a guaranteed minimum income, or
other critical social goods. Not to be too glib, but someone
with a commitment to this model of rationality may well
welcome an administrator who is biased, so long as in the
right direction. And she may fret only about systematic
biases in an anti-regulatory direction. Certainly, the popular
literature on administration in this fraught era of Trump and
his deregulatory agenda is rife with concerns of this sort.
Another way to look at this matter is to see the new
rights perspective as urging upon administrators protections
against external bias that push systematically, and
asymmetrically, in one direction. Pecuniary self-interest,
again, looms as the most serious threat. We may believe that
big money will tilt in non-progressive directions. The new
rights perspective will expectedly worry especially about this
tilt. Likewise, an administrator who proves vulnerable to
external influence, either through the efforts of an interest
group or a legislator is at risk of sacrificing the commitment
to protecting individuals from bureaucratic neglect and of
denying to these individuals what they are owed as
regulatory beneficiaries. Bias doctrine, in this account, might
act as a sort of Elyian/Carolene Products footnote four
mechanism to safeguard at-risk beneficiaries from a process
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that is undemocratic and unresponsive.295 When rationality
as defined as the sufficient protection of regulatory
beneficiaries and the tethering of Kafkaesque bureaucratic
actions to the rule of law and to rights as trumps,296 then the
closed-minded decisionmaker who acts for reasons and on
behalf of interests that are orthogonal to these objectives is
to be disfavored and distrusted, and the law will need to
redress these problems.
The most interesting, and perhaps most vexing,
connection between the law of bias and these models of
rationality comes about when we consider the matter of
political influence on agency decisionmaking. At the most
basic level, administrative rationality in all of these forms
resists efforts to politicize the administrative process, for
such efforts risk destabilizing the integrity of the process,
introducing elements such as political preferences into the
equation, and rendering administrators vulnerable to
recrimination and replacement. Although the logical
relationship between the ideal of regulatory rationality and
agency independence is not obvious, it is no coincidence that
explanations of the value and virtues of broad agency power
are often accompanied by worries that agencies are
insufficiently independent from political influence.297
To summarize, administrative rationality underlays the
concern with bias in regulatory administration, but in ways
that are not especially transparent. As with the matter of
adjudicatory fairness discussed in Section A above, the
applications of the general principle that administrative
decisions require a decisionmaker who is not financially
compromised, has an open mind, and is not subject,
especially in a matter involving individual rights and claims,
295. Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
296. See generally the discussion in Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court 2017
Term—Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28 (2018).
297. A theme also reflected in the caselaw as well. See, e.g., Organized Vill. of
Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 795 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
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to political pressure, serves the aim of improving the
administrative rationality of agency decisions (in reality and
in appearance). However, when we peel the onion and
investigate in more depth and breadth what exactly we mean
by administrative rationality, we can see that some bias
doctrines subserve the goal of administrative rationality,
while others are in tension with these goals.
IV. RETHINKING THE LAW OF BIAS
In the previous Part, we situated the wide swath of antibias doctrines into a framework to help illuminate the
purpose of these diverse anti-bias rules and doctrines. We
looked skeptically at how they map onto the ultimate
fairness and rationality goals of administrative process and
how they might accompany an alternative account, grounded
in positive political theory, of regulatory administration. We
now want to come from the forest back into the trees to
explore the fault lines between these bias doctrines and the
assumptions and activities of the contemporary
administrative state. We will see anew the discordance
between doctrine and purpose, between the configuration of,
and rationale for, one or another anti-bias rule. Let me begin
on a generous note: Judges are not engaged in casuistry; nor
is the problem one of poor judicial craft or lack of
imagination. Bias law is problematic because it lacks an
adequate theory. As we saw in the previous Part, it is not
clear why biased administrative decisionmaking is bad. And
if we cannot successfully separate bad decisionmaking from
good decisionmaking, we will not be able to preserve through
judicial intervention the faith and trust in our
administrative process. Or, to put it another way, we will
need to look elsewhere in the law of regulatory
administration to meet these objectives.
A. What is Sacred? What is Profane?
When contemplating the question of how best to
reconcile the many strands of bias doctrine with the grand
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ideal of impartial administrative decisionmaking, naturally
our thoughts turn to Emile Durkheim. • The sociology of
religion, Durkheim writes, juxtaposes the sacred symbols of
religion as a collectively generated series of totems with the
mundane aspects of ordinary life, aspects which seem ever
distant from what is transcendent, what is sacred.298 The
ideal of the pure decisionmaker is the sacred in this analogy.
It is our normative baseline, our polestar from which we can
assess, in the particulars of one another case, whether an
administrator has met the ideal adequately. Administrators
are sinners, however; they will come to the process of either
adjudication or rulemaking with a mind that is only partially
open; they will have the ordinary sets of biases,299 and biases
perhaps more extraordinary, given their backgrounds, their
experiences, their temperament, their cognitive abilities, the
regulatory circumstances they confront,300 and so on. Under
the right circumstances, they may become susceptible to selfinterest, to their own built-in prejudices, and/or to external
influence. In their imperfections, the duty will fall upon
courts to balance a presumption of honesty with actions
which point toward improper bias and thus fatally flawed
decisionmaking. To courts lies the heavy task of assessing,
on the facts of the case and in the profane real world in which
harried, all-too-human administrators operate, whether the
behavior is proper or not and therefore whether the
conditions of trust can be preserved. And, again, this
298. See ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS
Press edition 1965) (1912).

OF

RELIGIOUS LIFE (Free

299. On biases and heuristics, see, for example, HEURISTICS AND BIAS: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al., eds. 2002); AMOS
TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman, et al, eds. 1982); Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 751 (2003); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Bias, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974).
300. See, e.g., Brian H. MacGillivray, Characterising bias in regulatory risk
and decision analysis: An analysis of heuristics applied in health technology
appraisal, chemicals regulation, and climate change governance, 105 ENV’T INT’L
20 (2017); M.V. Rajeev Gowda, Heuristics, Bias, and the Regulation of Risk, 32
POL. STUD. 59 (1999).
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adequacy is assessed against a truly sacred ideal, one in
which the most embedded totem is lady justice with a
blindfold, the umpire unattentive to the team jersey of the
batter, but just calling balls and strikes.
It is at this juncture of evaluation, this effort to match
circumstances to the ideal, when things start to go awry. We
think too much of the totems, mythologizing the ideal beyond
what is worthwhile for a plausible positive and normative
ambition of regulatory administration. This is a common
problem. And we think too little of the workaday world in
which the agency typically operates. In literature, the
writers juxtapose this incredibly dense, inscrutable place of
bureaucracy, where vexed citizens are run through “the
absurdist hoops of functionary ringmasters,”301 in order to
get to a decision that is fair and rational. This is the world of
Kafka;302 and it is to the courts that, principally through its
enforcement of Due Process, that this bureaucracy can be
penetrated and bias, if not the banality of the bureaucratic
state more generally, rooted out.
A more balanced and empirically informed assessment of
the modern process of regulatory administration is necessary
to capture the benefits and costs of a robust, judge-made bias
doctrine. The scaffolding of such a comprehensive, measured
view is the project of generations of bureaucracy scholars,
beginning with Weber and continuing to the present day.303
While the project is far from completed, and is contingent in
ways appropriate to systems ever in flux and deeply
embedded in dynamic politics (not to mention culture and
technology), we can offer a more nuanced picture of
administrative officials and their functioning as
301. Five Masterpieces of Bureaucratic Malaise, LITERARY HUB (Apr. 15, 2015),
https://lithub.com/five-masterpieces-of-bureaucratic-malaise/.
302. See FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (1925); see also CHARLES DICKENS, LITTLE
DORRIT (1857) (describing the “Circumlocution Office,” a nightmarish, all
powerful super-agency in the British government); DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, THE
PALE KING (2011) (describing the IRS).
303. See, e.g., RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT, supra note 170.
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administrative decisionmakers, once we clarify what they
are being tasked to do and under whose charge they are
governing.
Administrative agencies are problem solvers. Moreover,
as Fuller understood in his depiction of adjudication,
administrative agencies will confront polycentric—or, we
might say—“super wicked problems.”304 They will make
decisions which involve allocation of scarce governmental
resources; and, in doing so, they will satisfice at least as often
as they will optimize, if not more often.305 Agencies exist in a
world in which tradeoffs are ubiquitous and in which the
choice set is defined less by the language of rights, and more
by the idea that agencies will use reason and judgment, along
with fact-finding and evidence gathering, in order to make
and implement policy that meets standards of
reasonableness set by Congress and also by principles of
administrative law. Sometimes they will transform society
with extraordinary regulatory innovations; other times they
will simply “muddle through.”306 Individualized justice is not
beside the point, but it is to be understood within frameworks
that are more suited to the nature and functioning of
bureaucracy and regulatory administration.307 With this
perspective of regulatory governance in hand, we should
resist efforts to recreate the same totems of justice and then
304. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate
Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153
(2009). The term “wicked problems” is introduced in Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin
M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 POL’Y SCI. 155, 160–69
(1973). “Super” is added as a reflection of additional features, including “the fact
that time is not costless, so the longer it takes to address the problem, the harder
it will be to do so.” See Lazarus, supra, at 1160.
305. See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J.
ECON. 99 100–01 (1955). See the discussion in VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION,
supra note 3, at 179–83.
306. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959).
307. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure
Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95 (2003); Ronald A. Cass, Models of
Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REV. 363 (1986).
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to assess agency performance against the standards drawn
from ordinary lawmaking and legal decisionmaking.
The belief in adjudicatory fairness as a sine qua non of
proper agency conduct is intuitively appealing, but
ultimately misguided. First, it rests on an incomplete view of
the function of agency decisionmaking in instances save for
the most formal scheme of adjudication, where an agency is
tasked with resolving disputes over specific claims and in
which property rights or liberty interests are clearly
implicated. In every other context, and arguably even in this
context, fairness to identifiable individuals is contingent; it
depends upon the function of the agencies as configured by
Congress and, as well, the capacity of an agency to manage a
hearing in ways that scrupulously avoid external influences,
be they intervening humans or prior beliefs or heuristic short
cuts. Second, strict attention to bias in agency adjudications
has the matter essentially backwards. Courts use bias to
make an informal process into something more formal than
ordinary adjudication where the lines between ex parte and
transparency are more clear cut. However, the question
should be this: Of what kind and for what purposes is this
decisionmaking process—called clumsily adjudication in the
administrative context as a catch-all for processes that are
not rulemaking—designed? We are told by the Court that
some kind of a hearing is generally adequate;308 and we
should not define what kind that is by reference to an
exogenous commitment to a truly unbiased decisionmaker
because that is what is required for adjudicatory fairness.
Finally, there is no easy way to accommodate the values of
fairness into rulemaking. Courts have been rightly hesitant
to exclude entirely considerations of bias in rulemaking
settings, as there are circumstances in which rulemaking is
conducted via a process that is adjudicatory in nearly every
element other than name. Rulemaking is, as Peter Strauss

308. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Friendly, Hearing, supra
note 16. See supra text accompanying notes 15–16.
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labeled it, a continuum, and not an on-off switch.309 And so
the question that arises ubiquitously in rulemaking are the
obligations of the administrative decisionmaker to be fair, as
if the gold standard of fairness is adjudication. Rulemaking
is the process which, in the administrative state, resembles
law-making.310 We speak critically of certain legislative
decisions with terms such as invidious, inefficient,
consequential, courageous, and so forth. But we stretch our
language too far to speak of legislative lawmaking as fair.311
And we typically do not (with the complicated qualification
about animus discussed below) expect our legislators to be
unbiased or independent from influence. So, here again,
fairness, except in the extreme case, becomes an unstable
basis from which we can articulate meaningful, efficacious
bias principles.
With a generally skeptical view on the modern approach
to bias in the air, we turn next to some specific
considerations.
B. Self-Dealing
Pecuniary self-interest is the most enduring area where
bias, or the appearance of bias, is ruled as inappropriate. And
the remedies for such transgressions are generally rigorous.
We have discussed pecuniary self-dealing from both a
doctrinal perspective and in the context of both adjudicatory
fairness and administrative rationality and we will not
repeat this discussion here. Rather, I want to note the
difficulties in the application of a doctrine which has
enormous intuitive appeal as a bellwether of good
administrative decisionmaking.
The problems are large. First, we have to be ever precise
in defining what we mean by self-interest; second, and
309. See Peter Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463 (1992).
310. See Bi-Metallic, v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
311. But see Hans Linde, Due Process in Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197
(1976).
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relatedly, we need to be able to delineate the line between
self-interest and public interest; and, third, we need to
identify the source of the constraint. Are we prepared to
declare and commit to a constitutional decision rule under
due process, with the porousness that such a rule entails? Or
should we leave these matters up to the judgments of
statutory or common law?
In the case law, self-dealing as a problem of bias
generally arises in the case of private financial interest.312 It
is our intuitive sense that a process headed by an official with
a vested financial interest is deeply wrong.313 Hence the
ancient lineage of the “nemo iudex” maxim.314 Yet, I worry,
along with Adrian Vermeule, about the meaningfulness of
the principle and about the slippery slope.315 As he points
out, there are many contexts in public law in which we
tolerate decisionmaking which can be easily viewed as deeply
self-interested and, therefore, creating risks that the
outcomes are not based upon appropriate criteria. Judicial
review of laws which impinge on judicial power is one clear
example;316 another is political gerrymandering.317 Why do

312. See supra text accompanying notes 29–43.
313. As is reflected in the caselaw. See, e.g., Ward, 409 U.S. 57; FTC v. Cement
Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Alpha Epsilon Phi Tau Chapter Housing Ass’n v.
City of Berkeley, 114 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1997); Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. U.S.
Dep’t of Transp., 899 F.2d 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Hameetman v. City of Chicago,
776 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1985); Morris v. City of Danville, 744 F.2d 1041 (4th Cir.
1984); Skelly Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 375 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1967), cert.
granted, 398 U.S. 817 (1967), and judgment aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 390 U.S.
747 (1968); Pangburn v. Civ. Aeronautics Bd., 311 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962);
Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896
(1959).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 27–28.
315. See Vermeule, The Limits of Impartiality, supra note 2, at 399.
316. See id. at 395; see also Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against
Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
317. See Vermeule, The Limits of Impartiality, supra note 2, at 403; see also
Nathaniel Persily, Reply, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for
Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV.
69 (2002).
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we tolerate these manifestly self-interested decisionmaking
rubrics? In the case of judicial review, it may be no more
mysterious than the idea behind the rule of necessity, that
is, we have no other real alternative. In the case of political
gerrymandering, it may be because of judicial incapacity, if
we believe (as I do) that there are no meaningful standards
to apply under our scheme of constitutional law, or if the cure
of intervention is worse than the disease. Ultimately, the
heart of the question is whether we can avoid the scenario in
which the decisionmaker has skin in the game and at what
cost. In essence, can we effectively design a “nemo iudex”
doctrine that is neither under- nor over inclusive? These are
the right questions to ask. But, too, it is right to begin with
the core principle, a principle which will inevitably put a
thumb on the scale, that self-dealing is wrong, and that it
costs us not only in undermining some unsteady notion of
adjudicatory fairness or administrative rationality, but that
it costs us in the ability of agencies to realize objectives set
by lawmakers ex ante.
Are we therefore showing out the baby with the
bathwater? Not at all. Let us suppose that the core is as a
stone fruit and not the proverbial seedless grape.318 How
should we apply this principle in the real run of cases?
In his dissent in Caperton, Chief Justice Roberts zeroes
in on the distinction between actual bias and the
“probability” or mere appearance of bias.319 The line drawn
is an unsteady one, and the Tumey line of cases acknowledge,
as Justice Kennedy admits, that it will be difficult, if not
impossible, to assess how much of a role money played in the
judge’s decision—hence the prophylactic of disqualifying a

318. Administrative law aficionados will get the reference to Ernest Gellhorn
and Glen O. Robinson’s famous comment that the Chevron doctrine has “no more
at its core than a seedless grape.” Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson,
Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 780 (1975).
319. See Caperton v. Massey, 556 U.S. 868, 898 (Robert, C.J., dissenting).
Three other justices (Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) joined the Chief Justice’s
dissenting opinion.
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judge when there is a financial benefit that accrues from a
decision in one direction versus another. But, for Roberts, it
is the impossibility of discerning real bias from possible bias
that undergirds the misguided test of Caperton. This
standard, he insists, is “inherently boundless”320 and “fails to
provide clear, workable guidance for future cases.”321 Yet, the
difficulty that Roberts raises so stridently in his Caperton
dissent did not begin with that case. Courts had been
instructed to search for pecuniary self-interest for a long
while.
Chief Justice Roberts is on the money when he expresses
deep skepticism that courts will be able to answer the long
list of inevitable questions, which he says reveals the
difficulty of the doctrine.322 While Caperton is a case
involving state judges, there is little reason to believe that
the problems are less acute where administrative agencies
are concerned. Moreover, there are special concerns with
excavating and policing self-interest in the case of
administrative decisionmaking. For one thing, if the issue is
with the agency as a whole, the rule of necessity is hard to
get around.323 There are no back up agencies available to
administer, say, the securities laws or to regulate unfair
trade practices. Moreover, even where the issue is with one
agency official in a multi-member agency, the effect of
recusal is a serious one, perhaps leaving the agency without
a sufficient body to make decisions by majority rule. These
are not insurmountable issues, but they are serious ones.
And the worries expressed by Roberts in the context of a

320. Id. at 898.
321. Id. at 893. The chief justice thereupon lists forty questions (!) which he
says the courts, in applying this rule, will have to confront in resolving a selfinterest bias claim. Id.
322. See id. at 893–98.
323. This is because the disqualification of the agency as a whole leaves no one
to resolve the dispute in an adjudicatory process. The leading case for the rule of
necessity in American administrative law is Cement Institute v. FTC, 333 U.S.
683 (1948).
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judicial proceeding, which, let us face it, looks and smells
really bad given the major financial donations given by A.T.
Massey’s CEO to Justice Blankenship, do have bite when
administrative adjudication is in issue.324
In the larger sense, the standards of conduct should be
identified in advance by statute or by regulation. While bias
regulation originates from Due Process and its insistence on
a fair process before rights and liberties are put into
jeopardy, the implementation difficulties raised in cases
where self-dealing raises a threat call for more care. Ideally,
this care includes manageable standards, laid out in
advance, and drawn from the experience federal and state
authorities have in establishing conflict of interest rules.325
More controversially, courts should consider whether
administrators’ compliance with these rules gives them an
adequate safe harbor, protecting their actions against
invalidation under the rubric of a due process theory.
A potentially promising way to manage official selfdealing is the continually developing body of administrative
common law under section 706 of the APA. Courts have held
in a handful of cases decided under Section 706 that agency
decisions that could be viewed as the result of naked selfinterest did not pass the threshold of reasonableness under
hard look review. Such an approach survives Vermont
Yankee, as we have seen, and the role of the court in rooting
out corrupt decisionmaking through hard look review is an

324. See supra text accompanying notes 44–52.
The Supreme Court recently considered a question of agency self-interest under
the Sherman Antitrust Act. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S.
Ct. 1101 (2015). Using a rationale similar, if not identical, to the Tumey and
Caperton analysis of financial self-interest, the Court struck down the actions of
a state agency controlled by dentists prohibiting non-dentists from providing
teeth whitening services. The risk, according to the Court, was that these market
participants would engage in “private self-dealing” rather than the public
interest. See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 15, § 7.7, at 893.
325. For early efforts along these lines in the context of rulemaking, see
Strauss, Disqualifications, supra note 16.

470

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

important arrow in the quiver of judicial strategy.326 The
availability of judicial review in the normal run of
administrative cases gives the courts the opportunity to limit
such naked self-interest without meandering into the more
draconian, and unsteady, matter of procedural due process.
C. Expertise and Prejudice
The requirement of an open-minded decisionmaker has
a strong intuitive appeal.327 We want to come to an agency
proceeding, especially an adjudication and also a
rulemaking, confident that we could impact the
administrator or the agency’s decision by the evidence we
produce and by the force of our argument.328 To find that the
agency official has already made up her mind is deflating;
and whatever reconceived approach to fairness, rationality,
or other goals of the administrative process we come up with
should account for not only this disappointment, but the
impact
of
prejudice
and
closed-mindedness
on

326. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 1689 (1984).
327. As the court put it in Air Transport Association of American Inc. v.
National Mediation Board, 663 F.3d 476, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2011): “Decisionmakers
violate the Due Process Clause and must be disqualified when they act with an
‘unalterably closed mind’ and are ‘unwilling or unable’ to rationally consider
arguments.” See also Miss. Comm’n on Env’t Quality v. United States, 790 F.3d
138 (D.C. Cir. 2015). See generally KOCH & MURPHY, supra note 54. (in section
entitled “basic right to impartiality,” noting that “proof of bias or prejudgment
without more may invalidate a decision or disqualify a decisionmaker”); PIERCE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, supra note 54 (describing this issue as
growing out of the requirement of “decider neutrality”).
328. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (requiring the
opportunity to rebut facts before neutral decisionmaker); Gutierrez de Martinez
v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 419 (1995) (holding that a U.S. attorney, on the facts
of this case, had an “institutional bias”); NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U.S.
656 (1949) (finding undue bias where hearing examiner found all of one side’s
witnesses trustworthy and all from the other side untrustworthy); Valley v.
Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 104 (5th Cir. 1997); Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d
1397 (11th Cir. 1996); Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist. No. 2, 31 F.3d 185 (4th Cir. 1994);
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Riney, 21 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. 1994); Jays Foods,
Inc. v. NLRB, 573 F.2d 438 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978).
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administrative outcomes.329
The problem with this principle of the open-minded
decisionmaker lies in both in its conception and in its
execution. In its conception, it runs directly into our
commitment to agency decisions as experts. We should want
an agency official who is optimally biased, who has a
perspective and a set of priors, borne of expertise, and who
can and will be transparent about these views before and
during the proceeding.
The D.C. Circuit illuminated this idea well in National
Advertisers,330 but stopped short of providing a safe harbor.
Rather, they suggested, frustratingly, a pretzel logic for
interrogating the agency decisionmaking process and
figuring out whether prejudgment rose to an unacceptable
level. But another way to look at National Advertisers is this:
If a fire-breathing consumer advocate like Michael
Pertschuk could not become disqualified as a consequence of
his rather unguarded pre-proceeding statements, then it
would seem difficult for a court to reach a judgment in the
more mundane instances of an administrator who has hinted
and gestured at a particular position.331
Courts and Congress should reconsider the fundamental
balance between expertise borne of familiarity and prior
experience and the tabula rasa approach. While it is true
that the bias doctrine in this area takes place against the
backdrop of a presumption of honesty and integrity and, as a
329. See Texaco Inc. and American Cynanamid cases discussed supra text
accompanying notes 60–66.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 89–94.
331. On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit in Antoniu v. SEC, invalidated the
agency’s decision because of similar comments made by Chair Cox. 877 F.2d 721
(8th Cir. 1989). The court summarized the test as being “whether ‘a disinterested
observer may conclude that [the agency] has in some measure adjudged the facts
as well as the law of a particular case in advance of hearing it.’” Id. at 725 (quoting
Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 896, (1959). That Chair Cox had recused himself before the proceeding was
resolved was not enough; the court remained concerned that his statements
tainted the proceeding during its pendency.
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practical matter, disqualifications and invalidations of
agency decisions based upon prejudgment are rare, the
principle of open-mindedness and the norm that limits the
availability of extra-record testimony and also restricts the
ability of administrators to trade on past experience or to
express opinions about issues in an upcoming or pending
case, is an imposition on agencies. The imposition comes both
from the risk that their decisions will be in jeopardy and,
more preliminarily, that officials with opinions and
perspectives will be discouraged from expressing these
views, either on the record of the proceeding or in public fora.
This legal push against transparency disserves the
regulatory process.332
On the stipulation that the law will continue to
interrogate agency decisionmaking in order to determine
when prejudice has gone too far and where intervention is
necessary, I suggest that we would do well to leave these
matters to the agencies to sort out through internal
mechanisms. Internal rules, what Gillian Metzger and Kevin
Stack have helpfully labeled “internal administrative law”333
are designed to limit discretion and channel agency decisions
in a constructive dimension.334 These mechanisms are not
332. See, e.g., BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 168 (1921) (judicial officers “do not stand aloof on these chill and distant
heights; and we shall not help the cause of truth by acting and speaking as if they
do”); In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651–52 (2d Cir. 1943) (“Interests,
points of view, preferences, are the essence of living. Only death yields complete
dispassionateness, for such dispassionateness signifies utter indifference.”);
Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 839 (1972) (“[P]roof that a Justice’s mind at the
time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional
adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.”).
333. Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115
MICH. L. REV. 1239 (2017).
334. See generally Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV.
421 (2015); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within
Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032 (2011). Any general action directed against a
sufficiently small number of individuals must be justified by a demonstration
that it is consistent with some broader pattern of administrative decisionmaking.
A requirement of this sort would generally differ from the adjudicatory
requirements of notice and a hearing. Most likely, it would consist of a general
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wholly internal to the agency, in the sense that they are
subject to statutory requirements, either through the APA or
the organic statute that establishes the scope of the agency
delegation. However, it is crucial, as Metzger and Stack
remind us, to see these mechanisms as fulfilling important
rationality and legality goals. Among these goals are a
process that is transparent and susceptible to influences that
push the agency toward better decisions.335
From one perspective, these internal processes are just
mechanisms to guide mid to low-level decisionmakers and to
help assist in the project of external agency management.
However, Metzger and Stack point, accurately, to a more
ambitious role for these internal processes. As they write:
Implementation and actual satisfaction of these [internal]
requirements . . . depends upon the agency’s own practices, not
merely upon how an external overseer evaluates compliance. It is
that internal structures that order collective action with the agency
. . . that provide the systems through which agencies incorporate
and heed, or neglect, external administrative law.336

In addition to internal agency rules and guidelines, we
should widen our lens to look at matters of organizational
design of agencies. This is a recurrent theme in much of the
modern literature on agency architecture and the dynamics
of administrative regulation. William Simon has described
features of agency design that fulfill objectives congruent
with administrative law and other external mechanisms for
improving agency performance. We can imagine an agency
being designed deliberately to improve agencies’ access to
information and data, all of which could open administrators’
plan or designation of a hierarchical decisionmaking structure. This would reduce
the danger of individual oppression, in accord with the primary policy underlying
due process. Rubin, Due Process, supra note 171, at 1126; see also MASHAW,
CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 223 (emphasizing
the importance of a “robust internal law of administration”).
335. See generally Metzger & Stack, supra note 336; see also Neal Kumar
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2328–30 (2006).
336. Metzger & Stack, supra note 336, at 1263–64.
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minds to new perspectives on one or another rule or order or,
better yet, to the process of rulemaking and administration
more generally. The rapidly evolving use of technology in the
agency process holds the promise of enriching
administrators’ ability to review and process pertinent
information. Insofar as biased decisionmaking is the result,
in any meaningful respect, of a paucity of information
available to help the agency official revisit her priors,
attention to technology, imaginative agency organization, 337
and design thinking,338 can be a useful corrective.
D. Politics
We finally come to the issue of what role should politics
play in the administrative process. Rather than reflect on the
large and important matter of political influence on
regulatory administration more generally, let me narrow the
focus to the nexus between ubiquitous political influence and
existing bias doctrines.
The Pillsbury case is the classic statement of the
doctrine. In Pillsbury Co. v. FTC,339 the court considered the
337. See William H. Simon, The Organizational Premises of Administrative
Law, 78 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (2015) [hereinafter Simon, Organizational
Premises]; see also Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and
Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011). Prof.
Simon’s evaluation is comprehensive and bold, pushing against the reliance on
external administrative law and toward a model that sees the performance of
agencies and the protection against excessive discretion lying in internal
measures and organization. “In a postbureaucratic view,” he writes, “the
paradigmatic norm is not the rule, but the plan.” Simon, Organizational
Premises, supra, at 69. While he does not address the matter of bias explicitly, he
does speak about the value of transparency in administrative decisionmaking, a
value that is at least a palliative against certain forms of bias.
338. For a good overview in the context of a general project which aims to bring
design thinking more squarely into the contemporary regulatory process, see
Applying Design Thinking to Boost Federal Agency Problem Solving, MITRE
(June 2018), https://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/applying-designthinking-to-boost-federal-agency-problem-solving. See generally Alice Armitage,
et al., Design Thinking: The Answer to the Impasse Between Innovation and
Regulation, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 3 (2017).
339. 354 F.2d 952 (1966).
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situation in which the FTC chair appeared before a Senate
committee and was grilled by Senators on a complex pending
matter then before the agency. “To subject the administrator
to a searching examination as to how and why he reached his
decision in a case still pending before him, and to criticize
him for reaching the ‘wrong’ decision . . . sacrifices the
appearance of impropriety—the sine qua non of American
judicial justice . . . .”340
The Pillsbury doctrine remains good law and, while it is
difficult to measure whether and to what extent legislators
have complied with its edict outside the bright lights of
formal committee hearings, it reflects a commitment to the
notion that agency officials should be free of political
interferences when matters are pending in an adjudicatory
proceeding. Yet, the description by the court of just why this
interrogation was so offensive to due process and to the
norms of fair and rational administration remains elusive.341
It is Senator Kefauver’s misbehavior that incurs the court’s
wrath. However, the redress for this conduct is not directed
toward Kefauver but toward the administrative process.
Presumably the court’s rule is intended to discourage
legislators from engaging in such jawboning in the future.
Moreover, the restriction on certain forms of political
activity does not negate—and indeed cannot negate—
legislators’ efforts to get their preferences before
administrators. In equilibrium, legislators will find ways to
influence agencies with their efforts. This is ultimately an
issue of policymaking hydraulics. The effort to limit one form
of political decisionmaking just pushes political officials
toward other techniques. There is quite simply no way to get
the politics out of regulatory administration; and a
commitment to a form of administrative rationality which
presupposes that courts could meaningfully implement such

340. Id. at 964.
341. For criticisms of the doctrine, see Rabkin, supra note 101, at 43. See also
Scalia, Two Wrongs, supra note 101.
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an objective is naïve.
To understand why and how we might want to limit
political influence through close attention to administrator
bias, we need to have a richer perspective about the
relationship between Congress and administrative
agencies.342 As we have explored frequently in this paper, the
concern about bias through political influence emerges in the
first instance from a notion that administrative regulation is
established through a process, political to be sure, that
aspires to goals that transcend the particular machinations
that accompanied the original delegation. This is a
normative point, but it also trades on a positive depiction,
characteristic of a long political science tradition, that
supposed that Congress was, in delegating, accepting that
agencies would move in directions that reflected preferences,
values, and strategies different than the enacting Congress
might have preferred (supposing that they had any clear
preferences at all). This is a traditional idea in the political
science literature, often summarized, wryly, as the “buck
passing” idea. But it has been resuscitated in key ways by
new generations of political scientists.343
A formidable alternative story is provided in the socalled positive political theory (PPT) of regulatory
governance, which posits that Congress, made up of rational,
purposive officials, creates administrative agencies to realize
certain goals and strategies.344 The dilemma Congress faces
in delegating to agencies, however, is that agencies may
become willful and/or will be vulnerable to executive branch
342. See generally Sharpe, supra note 98; Seidenfeld, supra note 98;
Mendelson, supra note 98; Watts, supra note 98; Strauss, Overseer, supra note
98.
343. See, e.g., DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC
AUTONOMY: REPUTATION, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE
AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001).
344. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 285 (Daniel A. Farber
& Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2011); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political
Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 1 (1994).
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influence, all of which will undermine the objectives which
underlay the decision to delegate and on certain terms. In a
series of articles, McNollgast (Mathew McCubbins, Roger
Noll, and Barry Weingast) have described a third set of
mechanisms designed to control administrative agencies and
thereby implement legislative objectives.345 They show how
administrative procedures, in the APA and in other organic
statutes, help facilitate Congressional control strategies.
This happens in two basic ways: by stacking the deck in favor
of certain agency policies, policies which reflect the
preferences of the enacting coalition within Congress; and,
as well, by putting these decisionmaking processes on autopilot, meaning that members of Congress can have the
capacity to control and manage agency decisions when they
go awry, but, meanwhile, they can count on agencies to act
slowly and deliberately to implement objectives that are in
alignment with Congressional will. Transparency through
administrative procedures can reassure legislators that the
agencies will not pursue a “fait accompli.”346
The basic reason to worry about bias in the PPT model
of regulatory administration is that biased decisionmaking
is insufficiently transparent. If administrators will not
disclose the evidence and bases for their decisions, legislators
will not be able to exercise their prerogatives and strategies
of monitoring agency conduct. This is true mainly for
situations of administrator self-interest and prejudice. In the
first instance, legislators, just like courts and members of the
general public, cannot be sure whether and to what extent
the administrator has an ulterior motive for her decision.
And, indeed, there is every incentive for the administrator to
keep financial self-dealing secret.

345. See Matthew D. McCubbins, et al., Structure and Process, Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA.
L. REV. 431 (1989) [hereinafter McCubbins, Structure and Process]; Mathew D.
McCubbins, et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control,
3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987).
346. See McCubbins, Structure and Process, supra note 348, at 446.
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What about agency self-dealing? PPT worries about this
circumstance if and insofar as the agency’s interpretation of
its jurisdiction, ratified by the court via Chevron
deference,347 pushes beyond what Congress has permitted
and expected. Whether and to what extent the reviewing
court, under the rule of the City of Arlington case, will put its
imprimatur on an agency decision that expands its
jurisdiction beyond what Congress permits is an empirical
question for sure, but it is also a theoretical question. That
is, we can ask why it would be that the court would align its
interests with the agency. Would it not be more plausible to
expect that, just as the Court said in Chevron in announcing
its two-step interpretive deference standard, that the inquiry
into the statute begins with a consideration of what Congress
wants and only afterward turns to an assessment of the
reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation? So, while
agency self-dealing is potentially a problem, its likelihood is
remote in this particular context; and, indeed, the review
process, even after Arlington, seems well designed to limit
agency willfulness and thereby limit bias.
There remains a strong case for limiting Congressional
influence in pending agency proceedings. It emerges not from
an ambient concern with fairness or rationality. Rather, it
comes from the idea that administrators should be
responsive in the main to the will of the enacting coalitions
within Congress, that is, those legislators whose democratic
decisions were critical to crafting the delegation and
authority under which these agencies operate. Permitting
legislators to intervene in this way will tempt legislators to
work to unravel the statutory bargain that was struck in the
original delegation.
This idea, to be sure, rests on the foundation of a belief
in Congressional will (that there is one way, and it is
important) and a broadly intentionalist perspective on
statutory interpretation. In this view, it is critically
347. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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important to see the enacting Congress as the proper right
focal point for assessing the scope of the delegation and, too,
the legitimacy of the agency’s action.348 This is key not only
to intentionalist theories of statutory interpretation but, as
Dean John Manning has reminded us, also to textualist
theories of interpretation.349 The constitutional authority of
agencies must be tied to the intentions of the enacting
Congress at some level which courts can and should police.
The fidelity of agencies to this enacting coalition within
Congress is essential. We should be concerned with efforts of
legislators to unravel the terms and structure of the original
legislative bargain. Berating agency officials to make certain
decisions implicates this concern.
The Pillsbury doctrine makes the most sense within this
framework. Agencies need help from courts in resisting the
influence of current members of Congress in order to
safeguard the bargain struck originally.
Presidential influence is more problematic. The more we
see agencies as no more nor less than component parts of the
executive branch, the more we can tolerate the prerogatives
of the President in directing agencies to decide in one way
rather than the other. The matter of telephone justice at the
executive branch level implicates some of the same issues,

348. This could be implemented in different ways. The key question is how
should it implemented. Compare e.g., John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (2015) (explaining and urging a textualist approach),
John F. Manning, Second Generation Textualism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1287 (2010),
and John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 673 (1997), with Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive
Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003) (explaining a
methodology for implementing the intent of the enacting legislating through
particular use of legislative history). See also EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY
DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION (2008); Adrian
Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy
of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES 549 (2005).
349. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 160, at 56 (“Modern textualists
emphasize that judges must respect the legislative compromise embedded in the
statutory text.”).
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that is, the desirability of executive officials putting the
squeeze on administrators in ongoing matters. For example,
in Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization
(PATCO) v. Federal Labor Relations Authority,350 the D.C.
Circuit held that contacts between the Secretary of
Transportation and an agency member, even in the absence
of evidence that there were efforts to influence this decision,
was a violation of the APA. This has the practical effect of
raising the costs to the executive branch of intervening, as
their interventions should be in the sunshine; whether and
to what extent the executive branch will bear these costs is
an empirical question. Whether they should, goes back to the
question we raised in connection with Pillsbury.
The larger question at issue is the appropriate scope of
presidential influence over agency adjudications or targeted
rulemakings, that is, decisionmaking venues in which an
administrator might become biased as a result of
presidential interventions. The conventional wisdom is that
the president has a unique role to play in the regulatory
process, although the contours of this role remains a subject
of spirited and sophisticated debate. Less conspicuous in the
literature on presidential control is the question of
presidential influence in pending adjudications. Beyond the
narrow issue of ex parte communications at stake in the
PATCO case described above, what are the appropriate
limits on presidential involvement?
More fundamentally, bias law, like administrative law
more generally, fails largely to account in a nuanced and
efficacious way with presidential influence because it has a
too-truncated perspective on presidential decisionmaking,
especially decisions made after a statute has been passed
and where the efforts are focused on matters of
implementation and messaging. A number of legal scholars,

350. 685 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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including Elena Kagan,351 Jack Goldsmith,352 Daphna
Renan, and others have made great contributions to a more
sophisticated, and ultimately more useful, perspective on
these matters.353 As we learn more about how the president
engages with agencies, as well as with White House staff,
legislators, and the general public—and, on a finer point,
how we can connect episodes and efforts to theories of
presidential administration—we will have a more robust
vocabulary to think about the contours and qualities of
presidential influence and control. We will then be in a much
better position to evaluate the costs and benefits of legal
limits.354

351. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245
(2001).
352. See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012).
353. See Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV.
2187 (2018) [hereinafter Renan, Article II]; Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents
Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805 (2017).
354. Just to note one interesting insight from Professor Renan’s work which
bears squarely on my prescriptive analysis of bias doctrine here: In her thorough
consideration of presidential norms, Renan describes what she calls “self-dealing
norms,” those, largely unwritten, directed toward limiting efforts to corrupt
through the exercise of presidential power. Renan, Article II, supra note 356, at
2215–21. Striking in her analysis is how thin are these norms, and how
dependent they are on the “consistent conformity with the norm over time.” Id.
at 2220. If we think about the scenarios we have been considering here with
respect to bias, it is perhaps remarkable that we have not had many cases dealing
directly with efforts on the part of the White House to influence agencies in
pending adjudications. This, pace Renan, may be because of long-standing norms
against doing that. However, to point directly to the elephant in the room, we
may be encountering a major change in that norm in this Trump presidency.
“President Trump,” as Regan summarizes the point, “does not appear to hold
himself to the same moral constraints, and expectations about what the public
would accept have not borne out in practice.” Id. at 2221.
An example of this norm-busting in operation, and the harried efforts of a court
to deal with the matter through bias law, is the remarkable dispute currently
unfolding which involves the effort by Secretary Wilbur Ross, on behalf of the
Trump administration to add a “citizenship” question to the 2020 Census.
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V. CONCLUSION
“American administrative law,” write Cass Sunstein and
Adrian Vermeule, “is organized not by any kind of politicized
master principle but by commitments to fidelity to governing
statutes,
procedural
regularity,
and
nonarbitrary
355
decisionmaking.” These commitments can and are fulfilled
by a balanced, adaptive series of administrative law
doctrines,
assisted
interstitially
by
appropriate
constitutional rules and interpretive canons. When used
properly, bias law contributes to this development in fairly
modest ways; and, indeed, this modesty serves well the aim
of Congressional delegation and administrative deference.
When used improperly, restrictions on bias and prejudice
and the imposition of a strict requirement of decisionmaker
neutrality in (especially) adjudication impede the
functioning of regulatory administrators and, worse yet,
distort the regulatory process. On the whole, bias doctrine in
the form developed by federal courts over more than a half
century is largely unnecessary and occasionally pernicious.
What we need is a streamlined and much more deliberate
approach, attentive to the particular circumstances of agency
and official’s actions and consistent with our commitments
to fidelity to separation of powers and political choice. If, to
use Vermeule’s evocative phrase, the contemporary
administrative state is an abnegation of law, we need
somewhat more abnegation so far as bias law is concerned.
But the situation is not so simple as to counsel a
complete rollback. I offer this as the best way to think about
the development and evolution of bias doctrines: We need
bias doctrines in some form and fashion because we don’t
completely trust administrators. And we have confidence in
courts’ ability to intervene as appropriate to enforce the
integral principle of an open-minded administrator. What is
required is a balance. However, lest this notion of balance
355. Sunstein & Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, supra note 6, at
401.
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become an airy abstraction (balancing what and when?), we
need it tethered to some distinctive view of what we are
aiming to accomplish. Let us turn back to the matter of faith
versus mistrust. Both are merely metaphors. By faith, we
mean we accord respect to the choices made by the political
branches, Congress and the President, to structure the
regulatory process in a particular way; and we believe,
consistent with our republican commitments, that they will
get the arrangements mostly right; lastly, we have faith in
agencies as complex, adaptive bureaucracies manifesting
expertise and governing on our behalf. By mistrust, we mean
two things: First, a fear that agencies will become willful and
officials will act inconsistent with their better angels of their
nature; and, second, we might lose clarity about the scope of
discretion built into regulatory delegation. After all, the
assessment of whether agencies can or cannot be trusted is
built on a normative depiction of what kinds of
considerations should go into Congress’s decisions to
delegate and agencies’ approaches to exercising this
delegated power. If we think that the best agency decisions
are those that are made on the basis of proof and evidence in
formal proceedings which look like courts, the departures
from the baseline of pure objectivity will be disfavored and
anything that agency officials do to depart from this baseline
will garner mistrust. If we think that agency decisions
should be based upon scientific information that can be
developed and assessed within the structure of agency
decisionmaking and, further, that agencies bring their own
experiences and knowledge to the table, then we will have
greater trust in agencies and will want legal rules which
generate sufficient transparency and also judicial standards
that assure that the decisions have been reached on
adequate grounds.
We should acknowledge that bias rules are partial and
tentative mechanisms to enforce on the system an ideal of
fair and rational administration that, while appealing, does
not confront adequately the complexity of the administrative
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process and the myriad objectives for regulatory
administration that we have both as a normative and a
positive matter. Worries about administrator bias, as we
discussed in Part III, emerge from incomplete (and
occasionally incoherent) views about the goals of the
administrative process; and even as the goals come into
sharper, and more compelling, relief, we cannot easily map
existing doctrines involving interest, prejudice, and
influence onto these goals.
All is not lost, however, as we have various auxiliary
precautions that correct for misaligned bias doctrine and
help facilitate the shared goals of good agency governance
(even while we persistently argue about what “good” means
in the world of regulatory administration). And, as I detailed
in Part III, there are some new ways, some incremental and
some more far-reaching, of solving problems raised by
administrator bias. Yes, this new clarity about bias and
adjustments to doctrine and regulation may well kick the can
down the road—the “can” here being the big question of how
best to view and assess modern regulatory governance and
how to measure the utility of public law against this
assessment. But hopefully the effort to take so many pages
to illuminate one key doctrinal area in administrative law is
nonetheless work the effort at attacking one part of an
immense edifice.

